The Thailand-Bhutan Bond, and Why It Endures
Something unusually spectacular happened in Bhutan early this month. The introverted Himalayan kingdom rallied over 40,000 volunteers, including martial arts superstar Jet Li, to construct 108 Buddhist stupas, each 15 meters tall, in just a day. The site was in the developing special administrative “Gelephu Mindfulness City” (GMC) on the Bhutan-India border, designed to attract young Bhutanese and foster economic growth. Of some 200,000 attendees – almost a quarter of Bhutan’s population – only one foreign leader was invited: Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul.
The ceremony at the GMC coincided with Anutin’s three-day official visit to Bhutan, his first to any South Asian state since taking office last September. There, he witnessed the signing of three agreements on healthcare, agricultural finance, and clean energy. He also nudged the Thailand-Bhutan free trade agreement toward implementation on New Year’s Day, 2027. It was endorsed back in April 2025 after a swift nine-month negotiation as Bhutan’s first milestone outside South Asia, and Thailand’s third success in the region, following deals with India and Sri Lanka. Around that same time, King Maha Vajiralongkorn and Queen Suthida of Thailand made a state visit to Bhutan – the first overseas visit in the King’s near-decade reign – during which they personally piloted a Boeing 737-800 into and out of the notoriously challenging Paro International Airport.
These recent events have cemented the already warm relationship, established 37 years ago amid Bhutan’s first wave of diplomatic outreach beyond its traditional security and economic anchor, India. Virtually everyone writing about the Thailand-Bhutan bond cites royal connections, along with the shared devotion to Buddhism, as foundational. Of foreign royal visitors to Thailand, King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck of Bhutan might well outpace all others in frequency. He has been popular, or at least familiar, among Thais since before his coronation in 2008, the very year Bhutan transitioned into a constitutional monarchy like Thailand. What is often left unsaid is how rare it is to be a Buddhist-majority constitutional monarchy. Cambodia is the only other state that comes to mind. Yet, as a product of the Khmer Rouge suppression, Cambodia’s monarchical and religious institutions lack the same clout to wield royal or Buddhist diplomacy.
Similar, royally coined developmental philosophies are another commonly cited determinant of Thailand-Bhutan solidarity. Both Thailand’s “Sufficiency Economy Philosophy” and Bhutan’s “Gross National Happiness,” conceived by their respective predecessor monarchs in the 1970s, prioritize sustainability and moderation over the maximization of economic growth. Strategic parallels also matter. Although Thailand and Bhutan have approached international relations differently, with the former pursuing highly visible multi-directional engagement and the latter opting for isolation by taking advantage of its fortified geography, both have historically acted as strategic buffers and evaded colonization.
Less attention is paid to the India factor, despite its significance in facilitating the deepening of Thailand-Bhutan ties from symbolic to practical. As noted above, India was once Bhutan’s sole international ally. Their 1949 Treaty of Friendship, specifically Article 2, placed Bhutan’s external posture under India’s “guidance,” while guaranteeing Indian non-interference in Bhutan’s internal administration. It was not until the 2007 revision that this clause was removed, giving Bhutan more foreign policy autonomy. Regardless, India remains sensitive to how Bhutan mingles internationally, having reasons to both encourage and restrain Bhutan’s diversification of partners depending on Indian threat perceptions. A more independent, resilient Bhutan is good for India, as this likely means greater border stability and less burden to support Bhutanese capacity-building, so long as Bhutan does not gravitate too close to those deemed dangerous to Indian hard security interests.
Thailand is hardly a threat to India in the absence of direct conflict and competition. They are actually becoming more strategically aligned, as evidenced by the impending elevation of bilateral relations to a “trusted strategic partnership,” paving the way for joint investment and supply chain integration. Multilaterally, Thailand and India are part of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and they increasingly see the benefits of utilizing it. It was through the Bangkok Declaration that BIMSTEC came to life in 1997, and Thailand has since primarily relied on this architecture – however slow – to connect with South Asia. Thailand’s Land Bridge (or what’s left of it) and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, which are high on Bangkok’s agenda today, both fall under BIMSTEC’s connectivity agenda. As for India, BIMSTEC has emerged as the most promising vehicle to drive South Asian cooperation and project Indian influence – without Pakistan. Bhutan has, of course, been a BIMSTEC member since 2004.
These fertile conditions make an uptick in tangible, measurable cooperation between Thailand and Bhutan unsurprising. In 2021, Bhutan ordered and received fifteen Thai-made “First Win” armored vehicles, making it the fourth user of this platform after Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia (see the SIPRI arms transfers database). In 2024, two-way trade rose massively: Bhutan’s imports of Thai goods saw a roughly 50 percent increase from the previous year, while Thailand’s imports of Bhutanese products totaled Nu 84 million ($280,000) compared to Nu 11.25 million ($130,000) in 2023. In 2025, Thailand’s leading Chulalongkorn University unveiled its formation of the Thai-Bhutan Academy for Sustainable Futures as a rare, dedicated institution for Bhutan studies.
Bhutan’s trade deficit with Thailand is structurally unavoidable, given the kingdom’s relatively limited industrial capacity and niche export offerings. The result is likely heightened Bhutanese expectations for Thai capital injections and capacity building assistance, which Thailand appears eager to provide. Anutin, for his part, has already made an explicit call for Thai investments in Bhutan’s GMC. Even if commercial gains end up being disappointing, capped by Bhutan’s small size and demographics, maintaining some material foothold and projecting Thai soft power in a state that remains cautious about outside engagement – as reflected in its handful of diplomatic outposts worldwide – is a win in its own right.
The question that follows – and one that deserves a serious analysis of its own – is how much soft power still matters today. The great powers apparently care less about it because they can afford to do so. For smaller powers, soft power is just what they need to stand out globally.
