BTI 28 – After the Revolution: Bangladesh’s Long Road to Democracy

August 5th, 2025

Host: Tushar Shetty

Panelists:

• Dr. Mubashar Hasan – Adjunct researcher at the Humanitarian and Development Research Initiative (HADRI) at Western Sydney University, Australia, and holds a PhD in Politics from Griffith University. Author of “Islam and Politics: The Followers of Ummah” and co-editor of “Masks of Authoritarianism: Hegemony, Power, and Public Life in Bangladesh.”
• Dr. Smruti Pattanaik – Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis. She holds a PhD in South Asian Studies from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University* and specializes in politics in South Asia and India’s policy towards its neighbors.
• Jyoti Rahman – Australia-based macroeconomist and keen observer and analyst of the Bangladesh economy.

The Fall of Sheikh Hasina and Institutional Failures

Tushar Shetty: Today marks exactly one year since the ouster of Sheikh Hasina*. In the time since, we’ve learned much more about the events that led to her government’s fall. In light of new evidence from various commissions and investigations, how do you evaluate the findings regarding the role of state forces, the scale of casualties, and the broader institutional failures that precipitated the uprising? Can we lay the blame squarely on Sheikh Hasina for her government’s fall?

Dr. Mubashar Hasan: The findings from different commissions, especially the UN fact-finding mission, confirm Sheikh Hasina’s* complicity in directing indiscriminate killing of Bangladeshi civilians. Recently, a BBC documentary verified Sheikh Hasina’s* voice recordings where she was directing the deployment of helicopters and shooting of citizens protesting against her.

To answer your question directly: Yes, the blame squarely goes to Sheikh Hasina*. She became so authoritarian that she lost her mind and showed total disrespect for international law, believing she could cling to power by killing people. We haven’t seen such a brutal regime in our lifetime – from the late 1980s until now. Most shocking was that a woman who was a symbol of women’s empowerment to the West, ruling a Muslim-majority country, turned out to be a bloodthirsty dictator.

What’s most important is that she should have faced the courts for the alleged crimes she committed. Unfortunately, on this day marking one year after her fall, we are still far from justice.

Tushar Shetty: Regarding the voice recording that came out in the Daily Star as part of investigations – have we verified its authenticity, and do we know for certain that she was directing party members or forces to use violence against protesters?

Dr. Mubashar Hasan: The recording was also broadcast by BBC World Service. BBC is a highly professional organization that verifies the credibility of audio before broadcasting, especially as a public broadcaster funded by British taxpayers. After BBC’s broadcast, the Daily Star published additional evidence, examining metadata. Both outlets confirmed it was Sheikh Hasina’s* voice giving commands.

We must also acknowledge that she weaponized intelligence agencies in Bangladesh, including military intelligence, DGFI*, NSI*, police, Rapid Action Battalion*, bureaucracy, and judiciary to cling to power. Many officials served her for material benefits – as we’ve seen in reports that MPs under Sheikh Hasina’s* government owned 600 properties worldwide, including 300 in Britain. When ordinary citizens struggle to own even one flat or house, a Bangladeshi MP owned 600 properties, including 300 in the UK.

Regarding institutional failure – yes, there was institutional failure, but it was politically motivated and directed. One year later, we still see many officials who engaged in enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings remaining in service. This shows utter disrespect to victims and survivors. The security apparatus in Bangladesh remains outside the reform agenda, and without reforming the security sector, including intelligence agencies, Bangladesh will not see a meaningful democratic future.

Dr. Smruti Pattanaik: I completely agree with what Mubashar* was saying. Regarding the voice recording’s authenticity, I won’t get into those details, but since she was Prime Minister in a parliamentary system where the Prime Minister is supreme, and given Hasina’s* position in the power structure, such killings would not have happened without her orders.

There was a coalition of interests that Mubashar* mentioned, and this coalition hasn’t completely disappeared. It seems to have broken now because the army broke away when the government fell, but the bureaucracy – many people involved during her regime in implementing her decisions – are still in power. Given how bureaucracy functions in South Asia, I’m not sure whether the stranglehold of these interests has been completely dismantled for meaningful reform to take place.

Security sector reform is extremely significant for political process reform, because police is the instrument of any government that comes to power. However, there will be significant resistance from security forces. I haven’t seen many arrested – very few. Most people who acted hand-in-glove with the past regime haven’t been arrested or faced action.

Dr. Yunus’s Performance and Challenges

Tushar Shetty: Smruti, how would you assess the performance of Dr. Yunus’s interim administration over the past year, and what challenges has his government faced in managing this democratic transition? I’ve heard he’s been accused of attempting to delay elections without a clear timeline. What might be the reasons he’s been pushing back on calling elections earlier?

Dr. Smruti Pattanaik: There were tremendous expectations after Hasina’s* fall. Various demonstrations took place – some for salary increases, promotions denied on political grounds – along with expectations that he would usher in an era where everything would change in Bangladesh. Obviously, this was an impossible expectation.

Very quickly, issues emerged with managing the government. Sometimes it appeared that members of the government were speaking out of turn – it seemed there was no unity. If Professor Yunus* was saying something, then advisors were saying something else. There were multiple voices, which shouldn’t have been the case when you’re leading a government with the burden of enormous expectations.

The challenges were numerous. First was the law and order situation – not because of what he could have done, but because the police force had fled. To manage day-to-day affairs, the military was deployed in some places. He faced challenges of maintaining law and order and dealing with lawlessness, where antisocial elements tried to take advantage through looting.

Second was the challenge of reforms – not just having commissions for various reforms, but achieving consensus over them. We saw how even for the July Declaration he read out today, there was no consensus. When I listened to him, I noticed many things he didn’t mention – he particularly omitted the BNP* period and movement history, instead focusing on nine years of student and people’s struggle against military dictators. It read as very focused on Awami League* history, not very forward-looking.

Regarding elections, there’s a jostling of interests. The BNP* wants elections first with minimal reforms. Jamaat* wants complete reforms first, then elections. Students want a new constitution rewritten by a constituent assembly – though it’s unclear whether this would be elected or unelected.

He faces multiple challenges. The election will be very significant because it will signal power transition from this regime to another and determine the sustainability of reforms. This isn’t the first time Bangladesh has undergone reforms – we saw this in 2007-2008, and all reforms were reversed. Some argue it’s taking time because they don’t want reforms to disappear like before, but what constitutional mechanism will prevent touching these reforms if they go against the party that comes to power after elections?

Jyoti Rahman: I’d like to characterize this as the paradox of Professor Yunus*. Exactly 12 months ago, when Hasina* fled, Professor Yunus* was probably the only individual who commanded respect across all anti-Hasina* political spectrum and was physically able to lead the country. Mrs. Khaleda Zia* of BNP* was also respected but extremely ill and in jail at that time. Professor Yunus* was the only person with political support across the board and the most qualified to project Bangladesh’s political change internationally.

However, and this is the paradox – he was probably the most unsuitable person to lead a major reform process and significant transition. This is because he doesn’t have any political platform, vision, or agenda of his own. There’s nothing in the reform process he could claim as Professor Yunus’s* vision for the country’s political future.

Because he lacks this, he presided over a vacuum. What we’ve seen – different advisors speaking out of turn, religious politics, law and order challenges – was compounded because Professor Yunus* didn’t have his own reform agenda. Everyone thought this was an opportunity to push their platform and ideas.

Once elections are called and held, somebody will win while others won’t, dictating who gets to imprint their vision on the country. If you think you won’t win an election – which is the case for most parties – you have incentive to delay elections as much as possible. During this interim period, if you have ideas but don’t think you’ll win and form government, this period is beneficial for you. This has compounded the problem.

Tushar Shetty: Do you have any updates on the exact election date? Are we still looking at early to mid-2026?

Jyoti Rahman: In his speech, Professor Yunus* didn’t announce a date. However, he did refer to differences of opinion on whether it should be a new constitution versus amending the old one. It seems he’s made clear that agreed-upon reforms will be incorporated by amending the existing constitution rather than creating a new one. He didn’t give a specific date in the speech, but there’s wide speculation in Dhaka* that a date announcement is forthcoming soon.

Political Landscape and Electoral Prospects

Tushar Shetty: Jyoti, with elections approaching, what’s your assessment of Bangladesh’s current political environment? We’ve seen changes with the fall of the Awami League and associated parties, plus shifts in the balance of power among major political players. Could you discuss this shift and the prospects for the BNP, who are believed to be favored to lead the next government?

Jyoti Rahman: After the Awami League’s* fall, there’s been a reshuffling of the political board. One important note: Bangladesh hasn’t had any credible election – national or local – since 2013, about 12 years. The last somewhat credible parliamentary election was in 2008. Up to a quarter of voters have never voted in any election, so we don’t really know which way they might go.

That said, opinion polls suggest BNP* is likely to win any parliamentary election, though their support isn’t as strong as one might think. Traditionally, BNP’s* support has been between 30-40% of voters. With 40% in a first-past-the-post Westminster-type system, you can easily win a very comfortable majority. BNP* is probably looking at winning 35-40% of votes and getting a very comfortable electoral majority.

Regarding Jamaat-e-Islami* and religious politics – the polls make clear these parties, particularly Jamaat*, have significantly increased support. Whether this translates into actual votes and parliamentary seats remains to be seen. Historically, Jamaat* has been geographically concentrated. If that pattern holds, they could double or triple their votes without necessarily achieving anywhere near a majority in seat count. However, if they’ve broken out of their geographic concentration, that could be very different.

The wildcard is probably Awami League* supporters. Historically, even in the 1970s when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman* and other Awami League* leaders were killed or jailed in military coups, and after Sheikh Mujib* had lost popularity due to famine and one-party rule, Awami League* still won about 24% of votes during Ziaur Rahman’s* time when Zia* was very popular and Awami League* very unpopular.

If the numbers are anywhere near that historic low, that’s still a large chunk of the population that may still support Awami League*. We simply don’t know because we don’t have ground-level data, and polls aren’t useful since Awami League* supporters might be too shy to admit it in the current political climate – similar to unexpected Trump or Brexit results in the West.

Awami League* isn’t technically banned, but their activities are suspended – a legal limbo. It’s unclear whether they’ll be allowed to participate. Even if they don’t participate under their banner, individuals might run as independents in areas where they’re strong, similar to Imran Khan’s* party supporters in Pakistan. The question is how badly they would lose if allowed to run, and if not allowed, where their supporters would go.

Rise of Religious Politics and Jamaat-e-Islami

Tushar Shetty: Smruti and Mubashar, the rehabilitation of parties like Jamaat-e-Islami into mainstream politics represents a shift in Bangladesh’s political landscape. What are the implications for the balance of secular versus religious politics? Are there concerns about the country’s secular constitutional framework and social fabric if Islamist parties like Jamaat and Islami Chhatra Shibir* enter the mainstream? Could this potentially lead to increased religious extremism?

Dr. Smruti Pattanaik: Jamaat-e-Islami played a very significant role last year, but they’re not in a hurry to capture power. Jamaat’s philosophy has been to strengthen its network across the country and build its vote bank. In one of my interviews with someone close to Jamaat, they told me they aspire to get around 20% of votes – if they achieve that, they’ll be very happy.

Currently, BNP* and Jamaat* aren’t in an electoral alliance, though in politics, you can’t predict – making the impossible possible is politics’ game. The question is what will happen to Awami League* – whether the government will allow it to participate, as it’s been deregistered by the Election Commission of Bangladesh.

It appears there’s no rethinking within Awami League* to go into Imran Khan* mode of fielding independent candidates, because it’s too centrally controlled – one reason for Hasina’s* downfall. So I’m not sure. Hypothetically, if Awami League* decides not to participate or isn’t allowed to, the struggle will be who captures the Awami League* vote.

My hypothesis is that Awami League* supporters won’t vote for NCP* because they see NCP* as responsible for Hasina’s* fall. Traditionally, Awami League* opposed BNP*, so I don’t see their votes going to BNP*. It appears votes might go to Jamaat* – this may seem strange given secular considerations, but there’s a current debate about whether Chhatra Shibir* people who fought with Awami League* against students and Chhatra Janata* should be tried for crimes against students.

In many rural areas, when Awami League* supporters were targeted, it was Jamaat* cadres who came to their rescue, because Jamaat* had taken shelter within Awami League* cadres. Perhaps the vote may go to Jamaat* due to traditional hostility toward BNP* and NCP*, which is newly constituted and has been involved in virulent anti-Hasina*, anti-Awami League* rhetoric.

Dr. Mubashar Hasan: I’ll focus on the political landscape and leadership crisis Sheikh Hasina* is facing within Awami League*. When discussing Awami League*, we’re talking about a party where elites have made money and fled the country, while the vast majority of grassroots activists remain in Bangladesh, many living in hiding and facing social stigmatization.

One core problem for Awami League* is the social stigma associated with the July-August massacre and footage of secret illegal prisons. I was imprisoned in one for 44 days in 2017 – I’ve seen with my own eyes how Sheikh Hasina* and Awami League’s* government disappeared people while families searched for loved ones. They kidnapped people and confined them in illegal secret prisons where prisoners weren’t allowed under the sun, confined in cells where multiple people shared one space. It was total disrespect for human dignity.

We need to understand the anger of people who took to the streets – people of all classes, including street vendors, rich people, middle class – all took to the streets against Sheikh Hasina*. That mindset still runs in society and many are determined to prevent Awami League’s* resurgence.

I have friends within the party – not all participated in criminal activities – but they say there are internal discussions about Sheikh Hasina’s* legitimacy because they’ve seen her family members, all foreign citizens of other countries, are all rich. These things are becoming more visible within party lines. It’s natural that when people stop getting benefits – which started last August 5 – they question leadership.

Even though Jamaat* isn’t very significant in voting terms, they’re very significant in influencing middle-class politics. Journalists stationed in Dhaka* tell me many leadership positions within bureaucratic organizations and universities are now being run by Jamaat* people. This is one reason they didn’t support BNP’s* proposition for early elections.

After Hasina’s* fall, there’s been realignment within Bangladesh’s political landscape. Many commentators used to term BNP* as center-right. In my assessment, BNP* has shifted toward more center because there’s clearly a breakup between Jamaat* and BNP*. BNP* refers to 1971 ideals of democracy, while Jamaat* tries to create a bigger Islamist alliance.

Regarding whether giving space to Jamaat* would encourage extremism – I don’t have definitive data, but I think we’re seeing realignment of the radical right. This doesn’t necessarily mean they’d espouse violence, but we’ll see much more conservative parts of society being more vocal.

This Jamaat* resurgence underpins two things about the party. One, they endured tremendous repression under Hasina*, who played the counterterrorism card to extrajudicially kill activists and imprison Jamaat* leaders. Through the International Crimes Tribunal, she hanged five Jamaat* leaders, making Jamaat* quite leaderless, but the party is still thriving. I wrote an article in The Diplomat magazine where Jamaat* leaders told me their membership has actually grown.

But does this mean they’re widely acceptable in Bangladesh? I doubt it. Looking back at the July-August revolution or uprising, the operation started after Sheikh Hasina* called protesters Razakars*. Razakar* is a very derogatory term in Bangladesh’s history, referring to people who sided with the Pakistani military during the 1971 war. People revolted because they found the term Razakar* undignified, and many Jamaat* leaders were allegedly Razakars* in 1971. In a country where people revolted in protest of being called Razakars*, I don’t think Jamaat* has much mileage for the future.

New Political Forces and Law and Order

Tushar Shetty: I want to discuss the emergence of new political entities like NCP* from the student movement, combined with the law and order situation you’ve all referenced. The NCP* is quite contradictory – they advocate for liberal values, secularism, and reform. I believe in their first convention, they began with quotes from the Quran, Gita, and Bible. Yet they express opposition to fascism and Mujibism* through street violence and extrajudicial justice. How would you evaluate the emergence of forces like NCP* and other student-linked parties in Bangladesh politics and their long-term viability? To what extent are mob violence and vigilante justice connected to this, and what implications does this have for institutional stability?

Jyoti Rahman: Everything you’ve said about NCP* is valid. They’ve tried to ride the wave of the July uprising – that’s their biggest political capital. The young leaders became celebrities overnight 12 months ago. They’ve consciously tried to portray themselves as moderate, very much within the mainstream of Bangladeshi political milieu, and have talked about being inclusive.

At the same time, their actual actions are very similar to traditional politics of crowd mobilization, tapping into patronage networks, with allegations of money flows and corruption. I don’t mean this judgmentally – this is probably how things work in the subcontinent, developing world, and indeed the developed world. Perhaps it’s unrealistic to expect a new political party to be different from the broader socio-political context.

Another point: this is probably the only political party in the subcontinent I can think of that isn’t centered around a key individual or charismatic leader. In our part of the world, even communist or Islamist parties with strong ideological preferences end up centered around key individuals – like Jyoti Basu* in West Bengal’s communist government, Sheikh family* in Awami League*, Zias* in BNP*, Bhuttos* and Sharifs* in Pakistan, Modi* in India.

NCP* doesn’t have such an individual above everyone else. On one hand, this is exciting because it’s something new. On the other hand, there’s probably a reason this doesn’t happen in the subcontinent – our socio-political landscape doesn’t favor collective leadership approaches. This makes things very difficult for them.

Dr. Mubashar Hasan: I think one reason for NCP’s* intolerance toward Mujibism* or equating Mujibism* with fascism comes from trauma. Key NCP* leaders were arrested – not even arrested, but picked up – by Sheikh Hasina’s* government and some were heavily tortured. Sheikh Hasina* justified her authoritarianism for 15 years under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s* name, using core rhetoric that she was the daughter of the father of the nation.

The human rights record under her government and corruption were beyond any record I’ve seen in my lifetime in any Bangladeshi government, including Hussain Muhammad Ershad’s* government. I’d argue this comes from trauma, and I agree there’s increased mob violence.

I also want to note that I wrote a Foreign Policy article in 2023-2024 showing mob attacks against minorities became a social trend that occurred under Awami League* government several times as well. It’s a discouraging and deplorable trend in Bangladeshi society. I don’t want to associate it with a particular government because minorities have suffered under every government – that’s a sad reality.

I think NCP* uses this rhetoric equating Mujibism* with fascism to court voters who are anti-Awami League* and critical of BNP* or Jamaat*. I don’t know the numbers, but I’d argue that’s a particular political project they hope will attract young people.

The law and order situation and mob violence are tied to absent political authority. I have friends who run businesses in Bangladesh. Many said under Awami League* regime, there was a chain of authority – they had to pay extra money (extortion) to party cadres, who would ensure businesses weren’t disturbed. Now it’s chaotic for them – they don’t know who to pay, and police don’t act strongly because if anyone from any political party is involved, they’re afraid of losing their jobs. This shows the hangover of police politicization under Hasina* – now they’re afraid that if they go after new political parties that may form government (BNP* in the future), they may lose their jobs.

I agree there’s a chaotic situation, but there’s also tremendous encouragement because people can speak freely now, which wasn’t possible under Hasina’s* regime for 15 years. I don’t see NCP* becoming a party able to form government currently – they don’t have that organizational setup. But there’s possibility they could make an alliance with BNP* and get some seats. There’s also interest from Jamaat* to form alliance with them, but I don’t think NCP* is interested because it would look bad internationally.

I’d argue NCP’s* best chance to become a formidable political force will come after the next government forms, where they could play an effective opposition role, constructively criticizing the next government and courting public favor.

Dr. Smruti Pattanaik: If I can build on where Mubashar* left off, I completely agree because in any democracy, you need effective opposition. Rather than discussing who will come to power, if NCP* can be effective opposition, that would be really significant for the country’s democratic progress.

But NCP* has sometimes made controversial statements against Bangladesh’s army, prompting ISPR* defense of armed forces. It’s not clear what exactly they want – I’m unclear about their ideological moorings and where they stand. They oppose Mujibism*, which I understand given that many were tortured, but many people’s histories with Chhatra League* are unclear – whether they left voluntarily or strategically to survive.

Unlike Juba Dal* or Chhatra Dal*, collecting protection money isn’t in NCP’s* hands, so I don’t know how they’ll fund their political party. Elections require money, which other parties have but NCP* doesn’t.

They appear idealistic rather than realistic sometimes. They still think it’s July 2024, but everything has transformed. I was frustrated last year in Dhaka* not to see many women on streets. When I asked a senior newspaper editor, they said it was safe for women, especially around Dhaka University*. But I felt uncomfortable, and people attributed this to absent political authority – police don’t want to act without knowing which political party or cadres they’re dealing with.

NCP* holds promise but hasn’t developed coherent strategy. They issued a 10-point statement, but I find politics chaotic. The Gopalganj* march to test Awami League’s* support base brought bloodshed. It’s better to organize at grassroots level in all 64 districts before confronting Awami League* strongholds.

I also find NCP* slightly immature – they appear in a hurry. They still have two members in government, so many frame them as the “King’s Party” that could play significant roles post-election if BNP* doesn’t achieve the two-thirds majority required for legislation.

BNP* is equally uncertain about their electoral numbers and whether they’ll get absolute parliamentary majority. NCP* holds promise but lacks the rural base that BNP*, Awami League*, and even Jamaat* have.

Some NCP* leaders’ lifestyles have been questioned. One advisor, Asif Mahmud*, was caught with an AK-47* at the airport, which doesn’t send good signals about a party supposed to bring reforms and move away from Awami League* practices.

The small space Awami League* has gained in opinion polls – even if not 18% as one poll suggested, perhaps 2% – comes because nothing has fundamentally changed in Bangladesh. The same corruption exists, though with less intensity. Political authority misuse, including official vehicles, has been reported in newspapers.

Freedom of speech has always been with people ruling and supporting them. Some people don’t want to speak, especially army* personnel, because they fear consequences. Currently, I don’t think Awami League* journalists have freedom of speech – Kanak Sarwar* and others have been arrested without trial.

Sometimes I wonder what exactly has changed in Bangladesh and whether we’re moving toward something better, but I place hope in the next election for transformation.

Dr. Mubashar Hasan: I want to add to Smruti’s* point about Gopalganj*. There was a clash between police and Awami League* supporters where at least four villagers were killed. Afterward, police arbitrarily detained hundreds of alleged Awami League* supporters and filed 10 murder cases against over 8,400 unnamed people. This reminds me of how police operated against BNP* and Jamaat* under Hasina’s* regime, showing that institutional reform of security apparatus is more fundamental than any other reform in Bangladesh.

I was looking at data today from Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index. From 2020 to 2024, Bangladesh’s position was between 152 to 164. In 2023, Bangladesh was 164, meaning press freedom was closer to Putin’s* Russia. In the past 12 months, Bangladesh is now at 149, indicating slight improvements despite many challenges.

But I completely agree with Smruti* that many journalists are behind bars, perceived as Awami League* supporters or those who publicly supported Sheikh Hasina* during July-August killings. Many journalists are framed or charged in murder cases, which is ridiculous. These arbitrary arrests, imprisonments, and false murder charges against journalists who may have supported Hasina* but didn’t participate in murders should be withdrawn.

Economic Prospects and Challenges

Tushar Shetty: Moving to economic transition, Jyoti*: despite her authoritarian governance, Sheikh Hasina’s* tenure coincided with significant economic growth, with Bangladesh exceeding India in per capita income. Amidst this uncertain political transformation and global economic uncertainty, including new trade challenges threatening the export-oriented model, how do you assess Bangladesh’s economic prospects during this political change? Are current economic difficulties temporary structural adjustment or indicative of longer-term developmental challenges?

Jyoti Rahman: If we look back at Hasina’s* economic record up until COVID, they did preside over impressive growth and development, though the growth story precedes them by several decades, starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s with garment factories, remittances, and significant female labor force participation – the highest in the subcontinent, with flow-on social effects when women work and have income.

However, in Hasina’s* last few years, there were significant economic strains related to the political economy and oligarchs propping up her regime. Toward the end in 2022-2023, billions of dollars were taken from the banking sector and siphoned off by Hasina’s* oligarchs. This led to the taka* depreciating about 40-50% over a couple of years, putting Bangladesh closer to Sri Lanka or Pakistan in depreciation terms, while the Indian rupee depreciated only about 10%. Foreign reserves halved, and inflation was very high.

One could argue these economic strains explain the sheer intensity of protests last July. When the interim government took over, these were immediate challenges: a near-collapsed banking sector, rapidly depleting foreign reserves, and high prices.

The interim government has actually tackled all of them. The taka* has started appreciating in recent weeks – something not seen in Bangladesh for several decades. Exports have performed fairly well despite tariff impacts, and remittances have flowed in strongly, supporting the economy.

The government has stabilized significant difficulties in the near term. Where things look tricky is private investment, related to political uncertainty and law and order. Mubashar* discussed how businesses must navigate tricky situations. Everyone has put investment on hold.

The upside scenario: if elections go smoothly and there’s an elected government that can stabilize law and order, next year in 2026 we may see significant private investment. I’m not talking about foreign investment, just normal Bangladesh businesses that haven’t spent anything in 12 months. There’s pent-up investment demand that could flow into markets next year.

However, there’s medium-term worry about jobs. Looking back to last July’s uprising beginning, initial demands weren’t about Hasina’s* regime, human rights, or democracy – they were about jobs. Over the last 10-15 years, there’s been significant increase in university graduates, but most degrees were from a university system completely hollowed out under Hasina’s* regime – basically just papers without producing skills.

Many young people, through no fault of their own, have little employment opportunity but high aspirations. They’ve seen that university degrees were tickets to better lives for previous generations – government jobs, private sector corporate jobs, good income. Today’s young people don’t have that opportunity because the education system was hollowed out under Hasina*.

This problem remains. You have lots of young people with aspirations for better lives, aware of what better life looks like through social media, but lacking opportunity to meet those aspirations. That’s a combustible mix. Whoever comes to power next year might see pent-up investment demand making things look good in the near term, but the economy needs to create millions of jobs in the longer term. How that plays out remains to be seen.

Foreign Policy: Regional Relations and Global Positioning

Tushar Shetty: Finally, on foreign policy, we’re seeing interesting shifts in Bangladesh’s regional and global positioning. Regionally, Bangladesh has warmer relations with Pakistan, evidenced by military delegations and increased cooperation, while tensions with former regional ally India haven’t been resolved. Globally, there’s increased US-China competition combined with unpredictable American foreign policy under Donald Trump*. On these two axes – India-Pakistan regionally and broader US-China realignment globally – what does Bangladesh’s foreign policy look like? What partnerships is it seeking long-term, and what are implications for strategic autonomy and economic interests?

Dr. Smruti Pattanaik: I think there appears to be a shift in Bangladesh’s policy under the current regime, but foreign policy fundamentals remain “friendship toward all, malice toward none.” In regional policy, Bangladesh’s approach to India has changed after the government’s fall because some current government members held India responsible for Hasina’s* continuation in power, plus issues like floods and mutual propaganda.

Frequent clarification statements by both governments indicate things aren’t entirely fine, and they’re victims of propaganda. Two issues raised Indian concerns regarding Pakistan policy. India isn’t opposed to Bangladesh having relations with Pakistan – after all, neighbors like Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Maldives have good Pakistan relations.

Two steps taken by the government concerned India. First, cargo from Karachi* port landed at both Chittagong* and Mongla* without checks, raising concerns given arms shipments that previously landed at Chittagong* jetty. What’s coming from Pakistan to Bangladesh without checking? Second, Pakistanis entering Bangladesh without security checks, considering the eastern border was used by Masood Azhar* to enter India. India became concerned about unchecked entry, knowing India-Pakistan dynamics.

Third, we saw visible Bangladesh government outreach to Pakistan, but the same effort wasn’t made toward India, or when made, wasn’t considered adequate given the relationship history between the two countries. It’s not that everything is lost – there are institutional relationships, though border haats* have stopped since COVID and haven’t restarted. There are border tensions over many issues since the government’s fall.

This dynamic now involves Pakistan as a factor in India-Bangladesh relations, making it equally significant. India is dealing with a transition government, though some Indian companies evacuated personnel post-Hasina* for security reasons, including project engineers working on various railway and other projects, bringing them to a standstill.

Visa restrictions have become very strict. One avenue for people-to-people connectivity – general public visiting India – has stopped, specifically tourism visas. Only student and medical visas are allowed. Recently, India tried reaching out after the terrible army helicopter accident, sending doctors and specialists, which didn’t find space in Bangladeshi media but I confirmed with the government.

I think the most stumbling block appears to be Hasina’s* presence in India and her political activities, though they’ve almost stopped. Today I saw a statement released from London by Sheikh Hasina*, which makes both Indians and student leaders very angry. The two countries need to find middle ground – it’s about countries, not leaders. Given geography, long-term security of India affects Bangladesh and vice versa, because as Mubashar* mentioned regarding radicalism, radicals are the most networked people in South Asia. They’ll find their way with larger objectives not limited to particular countries.

Dr. Mubashar Hasan: The foreign policy question is interesting, and I agree with Smruti* about the cold shoulder between Bangladesh and India currently. This enabled Bangladesh to reach out to or be warmer toward Pakistan. During Sheikh Hasina’s* regime, Bangladesh’s foreign policy toward Pakistan was an extension of Indian foreign policy to Pakistan.

Another interesting development is continuation of Bangladesh’s China policy taken under Sheikh Hasina’s* period. China invested probably much more than India in Sheikh Hasina’s* authoritarianism but didn’t speak much, unlike Indian government references to the father of the nation and 1971 history. I understand India played a big role, but I find it interesting that China is now accepted by all – NCP*, Jamaat*, BNP*.

Bangladesh’s foreign policy would continue toward China. For export markets, America is important, and Bangladesh secured a good deal under circumstances with Trump’s* tariff regime, indicating close working relationships with the US.

I believe Bangladesh should remain, as Smruti* said, “friendship toward all, malice toward none,” even though great powers will try to make Bangladesh take sides. But Bangladesh can’t afford to take any side.

Jyoti Rahman: I’d like to add that fortunately or otherwise, except during extraordinary circumstances, major global and regional powers usually had one objective in common regarding Bangladesh. US, China, Europeans, Indians, Pakistan, Turkey, and other players – no one wants to see a country of 170 million people, 90% Muslim, with economic development potential and risks, become unstable.

This is why there was significant development aid from the West and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s – no one wanted a repeat of 1970s-style famine and social disruption. This is why there was support for democratic transition in the 1990s and afterward. But this same fear of instability is what Hasina’s* regime used fairly well to sell her regime to all international players.

India was her biggest backer – that’s plain truth – but not the only one. Western powers, Western democracies, and China were also okay with her because she promised everybody “either me or instability, and you don’t want instability.”

I suspect the same equation will hold after elections, and all powers will try to nudge Bangladesh toward them while not pushing so much that the newly elected government tips over. They want to nudge but not push, because there’s confluence of interests across the board about stability.

There’s one big wrinkle: relationship with India will stabilize except for one issue – Sheikh Hasina* remains in India, which remains a potential political flashpoint for any new opposition to bait the new government with “you guys are too soft on India, you cannot bring her back.”

This is highly emotional and emotionally charged. Sheikh Hasina* is being tried, there’s evidence she ordered killings herself, she remains in India, the new government can’t get her back, and there isn’t really any way of getting her back. This remains a potential flashpoint that needs management.

Tushar Shetty: These have been great insights into Bangladesh’s domestic political situation and outlook for its economic and foreign policy prospects. We’ll have to see when elections are announced and how the situation develops afterward. Thank you so much to our panelists for providing fascinating insights into what’s happening in Bangladesh right now.

This panel discussion was conducted on August 5, 2025, exactly one year after the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s government in Bangladesh.