Sri Lanka’s Status on Religious Freedom
Photo courtesy of UCA News
Historically, Sri Lanka has been accommodating both legally and culturally towards its ethno-religious groups. While the Constitution accords Buddhism the foremost place under Article 9, it also safeguards the right to freedom of religion and belief through Articles 10 and 14(1)(e). The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has identified freedom of religion as an absolute right (Article 10) and, while Buddhism is given priority, the state remains bound to uphold equality and freedom of religion for all. However, despite the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion, the freedom to manifest one’s religion (Article 14(1)(e)) is subject to several legal restrictions, such as in the interests of national security, public order, public health, morality or for securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others.
Nevertheless, several long standing trends continue to undermine religious freedom and shape both legal policy and state action. Equally significant are other spoilers, including politico-religious hardliner groups that exploit community grievances, as well as rising currents of religiosity. Ultra nationalist Buddhist movements, practices of certain Christian groups identifying with the evangelical movement and extremist Islamic and Hindu groups at the community level have, at times, contributed to an environment that undermines religious freedom and pluralism. This article summarises findings from a recent report of the National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka titled The State of Religious Freedom in Sri Lanka: Annual Report 2024 on the presence and patterns of such entrenched trends among both state and non-state actors. It also examines incidents and trends that strengthen or weaken the environment for protecting religious freedom in Sri Lanka, focusing on developments from 2024 through 2025 and offering a forward looking analysis.
Under the current NPP government, there appears to be comparatively greater potential than in previous administrations to prioritise religious freedom and integrate its protection into governance and policy decisions. In October 2025 the government, through the Ministry of Buddha Sasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs, formed advisory committees to counter distorted religious interpretations by fringe groups. This move came in response to “growing concerns over the spread of distorted and misleading versions of the four major religions”. In light of such recent developments, this article is written with the understanding that this receptive political environment makes such discussions more timely and relevant.
Improving political climate
One of the key factors that boosted confidence in the NPP was its shift in political messaging on the role of Buddhism during the presidential and parliamentary elections. Unlike previous election campaigns, which relied heavily on religious symbolism, often at the cost of minority communities to gain electoral support, the NPP’s 2024 campaign moved away from such rhetoric. This indicated a positive shift towards a more inclusive and welcoming political culture. Divisive rhetoric, which once carried strong electoral appeal, lost much of its traction in 2024 compared to earlier years.
While this shift has helped set the tone for a more conducive climate for religious freedom, it can also support the independence and effective intervention of key state institutions such as the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL). The HRCSL has increasingly taken up religious freedom related issues and overseen state interventions aimed at promoting religious freedom. For example, in June 2024, the Commission investigated the withholding of A’Level examination results for 70 students at Zahira College, Trincomalee, due to an alleged rule requiring ears to be uncovered. The inquiry found that the invigilators had acted without objectivity and the decision to withhold results was unjustified. In September 2025, the HRCSL also released its report on the inquiry into the Digana riots of March 2018. The report outlines in detail the role of social media, especially Facebook, in spreading disinformation and hate speech that escalated into offline violence against the Muslim community during this period.
Laws, policies and religious freedom
Several key legislative instruments across areas of governance impact or are impacted by religious freedom and carry corresponding implications for other fundamental rights. This impact may be observed in the framing of the legislation itself or in how the relevant provisions of legislation have been implemented.
The Penal Code, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act (ICCPR Act), the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and the more recent Online Safety Act (OSA) are one set of such laws. While these laws are ostensibly designed to protect public safety and security, their broad wording has left them open to misuse, often in ways that disproportionately target minority communities.
Sri Lanka ratified the ICCPR and enacted the ICCPR Act with the stated aim of giving domestic effect to certain ICCPR articles not yet recognised in national law. However, critics have pointed out that provisions in the Penal Code and ICCPR Act afford special protection to religious sentiment by criminalising expressions that may be construed as insulting to religion. These have been described as creating a “de facto prohibition on blasphemy.” The broad scope of such restrictions risks overbroad censorship that fails the international tests of necessity and proportionality. In May 2024, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka pointed to the misapplication of Section 3 of the ICCPR Act, noting its use in relation to the arrest and detention of four persons in Trincomalee for engaging in a commemoration event and the alleged assault of a police officer. In May 2025, the Commission reiterated its position regarding the misuse of the ICCPR Act, requesting the police to stop criminalising or blocking peaceful commemoration events in the North and East in May and instead formally recognise and protect them as legal rights owed to the Tamil community under both constitutional and reparations law.
The PTA and the OSA also impose significant limitations. The PTA has long been criticised for its regressive provisions and its selective targeting of ethno-religious groups. In August 2025, during a visit to Sri Lanka, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that despite government commitments to repeal the PTA, it continued to be used for arrests and detentions. He called on the government to impose an immediate moratorium. Earlier, in April 2025, the European Union raised concerns about both the PTA and the OSA, warning that these laws were being factored into trade-related decisions, including Sri Lanka’s continued eligibility for the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+). In response to mounting international pressure, the NPP government announced that the PTA would be repealed in September 2025, with a formal declaration made in Parliament and at the 60th session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.
The OSA has raised similar concerns. Section 16 of the OSA defines as an offence any online communication of a false statement that insults or attempts to insult the religious beliefs of a group with the intent of outraging religious feelings. Yet it offers no clear criteria for establishing intent. Likewise, Section 15 criminalises causing disturbances to lawful religious assemblies through false statements. Such vague and sweeping provisions risk curtailing legitimate expression. The NPP government has since proposed amendments to the Act, including the repeal of Section 16 and opened the OSA for public consultation in August 2025, signalling a more inclusive approach.
Another key development last year was the Special Determination on the Gender Equality Bill that demonstrated how provisions and principles purportedly in furtherance of Freedom of Religion or Belief have sometimes contributed to the violation of other rights, such as Freedom of Expression and gender equality. The Bill was gazetted on the 17th of April 2024 and presented to Parliament the following May. Although it did not expressly address religion, the Bill quickly became a focal point in debates on religious freedom. Petitioners argued that, if enacted, it would prevent religious establishments (including the Sasana, convents, bhikku universities, pirivenas, churches and mosques) from applying gender-based criteria in admissions for those seeking to serve in religious roles. The Supreme Court’s judgment extended beyond gender to address related issues such as the decriminalisation of homosexuality and the legalisation of same-sex marriage. The Court noted that the Bill would conflict with established religious teachings and practices. Ultimately, it held that the Bill violated Article 10 of the Constitution (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) and Article 14(1)(e) (manifestation of religion or belief). With respect to Buddhism, the court further found that it contravened Article 9, which accords Buddhism the foremost place.
Archaeological conservation and places of worship
In recent years, developments at religious sites such as Vedukkunaari in Vavuniya and Kurunthurmalai in Mullaitivu have caused distress to local Hindu communities. The two sites were designated as places of archaeological significance in 2018 and subsequent years saw increased activity by the Department of Archaeology, the military and Buddhist monks. The Antiquities Ordinance and related legislation have been selectively applied in such cases, targeting minority communities and undermining religious freedom protections. Several provisions relating to lands on which places of worship stand or areas of cultural significance, especially Sections 6, 8, 18 and 31 in the Antiquities Ordinance No. 9 of 1940 (as amended), have been used in a targeted manner to advance ethno-nationalist agendas. In March 2024, several Hindu worshippers and priests were arrested for attempting to conduct worship at Vedukkunaari, which led to renewed tension around the site and protests. In an important court ruling in June 2025, the Mullaitivu Magistrate’s Court released Tamil farmers arrested on allegations of damaging the Kurunthurmalai site. During the proceedings, the government reportedly admitted that no gazette notification had ever been issued declaring the disputed land as belonging to the Department of Archaeology. As a result, the case against the farmers was dismissed and they were released. This absence of a legal declaration meant the Department had no formal ownership of at least part of the contested land despite years of state-backed activity treating the area as an archaeological site.
Similarly, in Mullikulam Malai in Ampara, the Department of Archaeology invoked Sections 15 and 16 of the Antiquities Ordinance No. 9 of 1940 (as amended) to claim the land as an archaeological site, thereby preventing the local Muslim community from resuming agricultural use of the area. In addition to the Antiquities Ordinance, Section 6(2) of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance No. 13 of 1946 (as amended), which only authorises the gazetting of urban development areas, has been misapplied to declare “sacred areas,” enabling the construction of Buddhist temples in the North and East.
In such situations, local courts in these provinces have, at times, attempted to curb such ethno-nationalist drives. However even when the judiciary fulfills its role, enforcement remains uncertain. Disregarding court orders constitutes contempt of court but their implementation depends on state machinery, which often operates in close alignment with the Buddhist clergy and the military. Beyond these specific measures, broader land related laws such as the Land Acquisition Act No. 9 of 1950, emergency regulations allowing for the declaration of High Security Zones, the Mahaweli Authority Act No. 23 of 1979 and the Tourism Act No. 38 of 2005 have been used to supplement these efforts. Together, they create a general framework for land acquisition that is marked by wide discretionary powers and significant imbalances of authority.
This dynamic has also empowered favoured groups at the community level where hostility against minority religious groups is often instigated by local actors and tacitly or directly supported by state officials. Evangelical and independent churches as well as Hindu communities have been frequent targets. One key source of grievance lies in the ambiguity surrounding the registration of religious places of worship. Although Sri Lankan law does not require such registration, local authorities have invoked vaguely defined rules to obstruct gatherings. Circulars issued by the Ministry of Buddha Sasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs, in 2008, 2011 (revoked in 2012), and 2022 introduced a requirement of ministry approval for the construction of new religious sites. The selective enforcement of these circulars has mostly restricted the Christians and their right to construct places of worship.
Separately, yet noteworthy are the Chabad Houses established in Sri Lanka which, while mired in controversy, have still benefited from the provision of security protection by the government. This development is situated within a climate where members of the Free Palestine Movement have recently been subject to harassment and summoned by the Terrorism Investigation Division, and the Prevention of Terrorism Act has been utilised against citizens on grounds of engaging in activities that were perceived to be anti-Israel.
Growing activities of Hindu nationalist groups
While Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist rhetoric has waned at the national level compared to previous years, at the grassroots level there has been a noticeable increase in the activities of Hindu hardliner groups. Organisations such as Siva Senai and Rudra Sena have played an active role in distributing leaflets and organising protests against Christian and Muslim communities in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The messaging of these groups largely targets Christians and Muslims over issues of alleged forced conversion and cattle slaughter. These groups also attempt to gain traction among local populations by conducting training activities around Hindu worship practices and holding meetings with Hindu youth.
Divisive rhetoric in the media
In the past year, divisive rhetoric in the media has shown signs of decline and was observed particularly during the elections, which reflected a notable decrease in harmful rhetoric targeting ethnoreligious groups. However amid this overall decline, a troubling pattern persists in the continued targeting of Muslims. In online spaces in particular, Muslims remain the most targeted community with narratives exploiting deep-seated fears of demographic change through conversion, demonising Islamic customs and associating Islam with terrorism. This rhetoric has also been linked to global developments, including Israel’s war on Gaza and the Rohingya refugee crisis, which were invoked to fuel anti-Muslim sentiment locally. In 2024, online rhetoric against Tamils and Muslims spiked noticeably in the immediate aftermath of the presidential election results with discussions on voting patterns in the North and East quickly framed along ethno-religious lines.
Continuing debate on religious conversions
Two key perspectives have long formed the rhetoric and debate around religious conversion in Sri Lanka. At the community level, there is a deep-rooted cultural and societal bias against conversion, particularly by independent or evangelical Christian groups. According to a report published by NCEASL in February 2025, there were multiple incidents against Christian groups across the country with most attributed to underlying fears of conversion. Conversion is often portrayed in general terms as coerced or manipulative, giving rise to a climate of fear. Sri Lanka’s legal protections around conversion have also been vague. While Article 14(1)(e) of the Constitution guarantees the “right to manifest” one’s religion or belief in worship, observance, and teaching, whether privately or publicly, alone or in association with others, Sri Lankan law does not recognise a “right to propagate” one’s religion or belief as a fundamental right. The Supreme Court has, however, in two of its recent cases – Karuwalagaswewa Vidanelage Swarna Manjula et al v. Pushpakumara, Officer-in-Charge, Police Station, Kekirawa et al (2018) and M. A. S. Kalyani de Silva et-al v S.J.B. Suwaris et-al (2025) – clarified that propagation does not constitute an offence.
On the other hand, conversion practices perceived as aggressive and culturally insensitive within some evangelical and independent Christian communities continue to fuel tensions, at times triggering inter-community conflicts with other religious groups as well as intra-community disputes within the Christian community itself. According to a 2024 survey by the National Peace Council, more than 50% of respondents from the Buddhist, Hindu and Roman Catholic communities identify that certain Christian groups are primarily responsible for the practice of conversion and that this practice often takes place in a way that negatively affects their religion, suggesting that the propagation methods adopted were resulting in inter and intra-community conflict.
While recent research and subsequent developments point to positive steps and the prospect of further progress in the years ahead, several key issues and trends require close attention by all key stakeholders, including faith communities, the government and civil society. At the community level faith leaders, religious institutions and faith-based organisations are in a unique position to nurture behaviours and attitudes among community members that promote a pluralistic environment that respects freedom of religion or belief. For instance, promoting culturally and environmentally sensitive worship practices will help address concerns with the controversial propagation methods of some religious groups. In addition, adopting a zero tolerance approach for ideologies that target other religious groups will discourage the rise of hardliner religious organisations in the community.
The NPP’s willingness to address longstanding concerns that have fueled inter-communal tensions is encouraging yet much more needs to be done to resolve persistent challenges. Strengthening religious freedom for all communities will require proactive action, particularly in reforming legislation that continues to be used as an instrument to target minorities. Such reforms would not only build momentum for change but also help create a long term political environment conducive to pluralism. They would set an important precedent for safeguarding the rights of communities long affected by the regressive application of laws and selective state responses. These measures have had trickle down effects at the community level, where exclusivity and discrimination have often been entrenched and legitimised by the actions of past governments. Reversing these patterns now will be essential to rebuilding trust and securing religious freedom for present and future generations.
This article is based on the report published by the National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka on the status of religious freedom in Sri Lanka in 2024 and relevant socio-political developments in 2025.
