India’s Bangladesh Policy Quagmire: Big Brother’s Recalcitrance and the Chinese Embrace
With its victories in the recent state assembly elections in West Bengal and Assam, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), or its alliance partners, are in power in all five Indian states that share a border with Bangladesh. This should make New Delhi’s task of implementing its Bangladesh policy an easy cake walk, since it will no longer attract opposition from the state governments. However, it doesn’t necessarily mean a reset in India-Bangladesh ties. In fact, a mismanaged hardline policy, lacking in nuance, could alienate Dhaka further, disincentivizing its present mood to repair ties with India.
The new Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in Dhaka congratulated the BJP on its victory in West Bengal, which unseated the Trinamool Congress (TMC) party. The BNP described defeated Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee as an “impediment” to the signing of the Teesta River water-sharing agreement and expressed hope that the new BJP government in the state would be different. At the same time, it voiced apprehension regarding the possible growth of Indian attempts at “pushing in” people who New Delhi describes as illegal Bangladeshi migrants. Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) personnel will stay alert for such incidents, Dhaka’s Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed announced. Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman was stern, promising that “Dhaka will act” against such moves.
Pushing out so-called illegal Muslim migrants from Bangladesh has been a priority for the BJP. Promises of forcible deportations may have contributed to the party’s electoral victory in West Bengal, making it expedient for the new state government to attempt, in tandem with the directives from India’s Home Ministry, to execute such a policy. However, in the absence of a consensus between New Delhi and Dhaka on the issue, the latter isn’t expected to take such action kindly.
India, in April, appointed Dinesh Trivedi, a BJP politician from West Bengal, as its new envoy to Dhaka, parting ways with a long tradition of placing only career diplomats in that position. The reason behind the move wasn’t articulated by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Perhaps, in New Delhi’s calculation, a politician is better suited than a diplomat to attempt to smooth feathers in Dhaka ruffled by India’s refusal to extradite former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Shaikh Hasina. However, as long as the BJP’s domestic politics continue to cast Bangladesh as a country that tolerates the persecution of minority Hindus and BJP leaders refer to Bangladeshi migrants as “termites” who threaten India’s national security under a sinister policy of demographic invasion, Trivedi’s room for maneuver will remain limited.
Extraditing Hasina, who has been awarded a death sentence in absentia for her role in the violence accompanying the July 2024 uprisings that deposed her, is a priority for the BNP, but not necessarily an issue on which it will let its ties with India worsen to the point of no return. Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Rahman came to India in early April with a set of requests that included the Hasina issue, but also the supply of higher volumes of diesel and fertilizer and sorting out the delay in issuing visas to Bangladeshi citizens by the Indian High Commission and consulates in Bangladesh.
India’s response, especially to the diesel and fertilizer issue, was reportedly positive, but bereft of the warmth that one expects to see concerning a neighbor reeling under the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. India’s petroleum minister told Rahman that such supplies will be made only after India’s own demands are met. India has a dedicated refinery in Assam and an agreement to supply diesel to Bangladesh, but is currently supplying a reduced volume of the fuel to the country.
New Delhi’s assessment seems to be that Dhaka has little option but to reconcile itself to the fact that India is an irreplaceable neighbor that alone can fulfil Bangladesh’s critical needs of energy, water, raw materials, essential commodities, health services, and more. These are well-established areas of cooperation, which can also be weaponized, as Bangladesh is now experiencing.
Bangladesh isn’t alone. Not surprisingly, there are more anguished neighbors than friends in India’s vicinity. Despite its much touted “neighborhood first” policy, New Delhi continues to act like a big brother and remains indifferent to its neighbors’ needs – until these countries seek a solution to their problems by engaging with China. India’s past foreign policies toward Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Maldives are instructive.
Dhaka, under the BNP government, is willing to go down the same road. Rahman proceeded with a three-day official visit to China on May 5, at the invitation of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Before his departure, he delivered some sharp words for New Delhi. Expressing his frustration over the delays in negotiating the Teesta River water-sharing agreement with India, Rahman said that his country will discuss development projects with China instead of waiting for the deal to happen. Rahman is expected to discuss trade, low-interest loans, extended repayment periods, and new investments with the Chinese side.
Beijing, slow to act in the two years since the downfall of the Hasina government, is clearly revamping its activities in Dhaka. It may jolt New Delhi out of its slumber. But it will be a case of hitting the track when the other competitor is already running.
