Space Technology is Redefining Maritime Security in South Asia
The Indian Ocean is an increasingly contested strategic theater, and as competition intensifies, its nature is evolving as well. Maritime power is no longer confined to fleet size, overseas bases, and control over choke points. The effectiveness of modern navies increasingly depends on maritime domain awareness, real-time threat detection, and the ability to project power across vast oceanic spaces.
As they enable better navigation, communications, and surveillance, space-based assets are becoming critical to ensuring maritime security and projecting power. Recognizing this shift, India has begun integrating space capabilities into its maritime framework. China, too, is expanding its orbital presence over the Indian Ocean. This dynamic is further accentuating the asymmetries in South Asia. As most South Asian littoral states have limited capacity to monitor and respond to evolving threats independently, they rely largely on external powers for maritime surveillance.
The maritime domain is undergoing structural transformation driven by automation, digitalization, and remote-control technologies. Consequently, both civilian and military operations increasingly rely on satellite-enabled connectivity and real-time data integration. Amid these technological shifts, non-traditional security challenges are on the rise and major powers are increasing their military presence in the Indian Ocean region. Traditional surveillance platforms are increasingly inadequate as systems such as maritime patrol aircraft and surface vessels alone cannot provide persistent, real-time coverage across vast oceanic spaces. As a result, integrating space-based surveillance capabilities into the maritime sphere has become increasingly important.
The integration of space technologies improves real-time surveillance, navigation precision and connectivity. Satellites equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical imaging enable persistent coverage irrespective of weather conditions or time of day. Similarly, satellite-based navigation systems provide more accurate positioning data, thereby making vessel movements safer and more efficient. Together, satellite-based systems enable tracking, detecting unusual behavior and interception.
Among South Asian states, India stands out as the most advanced integrator of space-based capabilities. Ever since the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, which exposed significant gaps in surveillance and coastal security, India has been investing in space-based intelligence systems. In 2009, India launched Radar Imaging Satellite-2 (RISAT-2) to address real-time imagery requirements. India then launched GSAT-7, a dedicated military communication satellite for the Navy. GSAT-7 has enabled secure, resilient communication across various naval platforms, including warships, submarines, and aircraft. The operational significance of these capabilities became evident during the 2017 Doklam standoff. GSAT-7 has reportedly been used to monitor the movements of Chinese submarines in the region, too. In November 2025, India launched another advanced communication satellite for its Navy: GSAT-7R.
India’s capabilities are not limited to data collection, but now extend to data fusion. India established the Information Fusion Center-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in 2018. IFC-IOR integrates data from various sources such as the space-based automatic identification system, coastal radar networks and maritime cloud networks. The processed information is then shared with India’s partners across the region. The Indian government has also sanctioned a project to launch 52 military satellites in the next five years under its space-based surveillance program. These initiatives indicate a doctrinal shift in Indian strategic thinking. India’s Maritime Doctrine 2025 included space as part of its operational framework, alongside land, sea, air, and cyber domains.
Meanwhile, China is also expanding its orbital footprint in the Indian Ocean region.
Chinese research vessels operating in the Indian Ocean region have frequently made headlines. For instance, Chinese vessels such as the Shi Yan-6 and Shen Hai Yi Hao are reportedly involved in mapping undersea terrain. Complementing these maritime activities are China’s Yaogan reconnaissance satellites, which provide all-weather, day-and-night high-resolution imagery over large parts of the Earth’s surface. In addition, Shentong and Gaofen satellites play a critical role in enabling space-maritime integration. Shentong satellites facilitate secure command and control, intelligence sharing and real-time communication across naval platforms. Gaofen satellites, on the other hand, provide high-resolution, all-weather imaging that enhances maritime domain awareness.
Additionally, China has developed its own navigation system, BeiDou. The system achieved global coverage in 2020. Some of BeiDou’s features, such as inter-satellite communication and reduced vulnerability to jamming or disruption, make it suitable for military applications. Its integrated architecture enhances China’s ability to maintain autonomous positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services in conflict zones.
Importantly, China’s space capabilities are not confined to its own forces. Countries such as Pakistan have increasingly incorporated BeiDou into their military and navigation systems, reflecting a broader diffusion of Chinese space infrastructure across South Asia. This has significant strategic implications, as regional actors are becoming embedded within Chinese technological and intelligence networks. Thus, China’s presence in the Indian Ocean is not limited to ports, bases, or naval deployments but extends as a constant overhead presence.
While India and China expand their space capabilities, most South Asian littoral states remain structurally constrained. Countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives are strategically located along major sea lines of communication, yet lack even basic sovereign space-based surveillance capabilities. Sri Lanka’s engagement with space remains nascent and is yet to translate into meaningful integration with its security architecture. The country made its first space flight in 2019 with the launch of Raavana-1, a small research satellite. Subsequent developments, including the KITSUNE satellite and the BIRDS-X Dragonfly nanosatellite launched in 2025, reflect incremental progress.
Importantly, these capabilities do not yet extend to operational maritime surveillance or security applications, leaving Colombo dependent on external partners for domain awareness. However, recent policy developments signal growing recognition of the strategic advantages of space domains. The Cabinet’s approval to formulate a National Space Policy and its official acknowledgement of space technology’s relevance to security, indicate a shift in Sri Lanka’s strategic outlook.
The Maldives faces an even greater challenge with a maritime zone exceeding 900,000 square kilometers. Maldives’ efforts to leverage space-based capabilities for maritime security remain at a nascent stage, though there are emerging signs of institutional interest. The establishment of the Maldivian Space Research Organization (MSRO) in 2022 marks an initial effort to develop a domestic space ecosystem. Recent initiatives indicate growing ambition. In 2024, the Maldivian defense minister outlined plans to develop a satellite-based maritime surveillance system. Meanwhile, MSRO has entered into partnerships with international actors, including a memorandum of understanding with Arche Orbital Systems to support technical development. Initiatives such as the proposed Maldives Space Fund to support sovereign space infrastructure signal a long-term intent. Nevertheless, the Maldives continues to face constraints in accessing satellite imagery independently and relies on maritime domain awareness software such as SeaVision to ensure maritime security.
This technology gap indicates the littoral’s limited capacity for independent surveillance. Thus, dependence on external data providers becomes unavoidable, posing consequent challenges to strategic autonomy.
The persistence of asymmetries in access to data and surveillance infrastructure carries significant risks. For instance, it can result in uneven situation awareness, with control over information flows concentrated in the hands of a few major powers. Even India, despite its rapidly advancing space-based capabilities, continues to face certain structural constraints such as data latency and ISR density. Consequently, New Delhi continues to rely on external partnerships for access to certain high-end geospatial intelligence. This is evident in its 2020 agreement with the United States to share sensitive satellite data. Thus, access to critical maritime information could become a monopoly held by those who possess the required surveillance infrastructure.
A lack of independent verification capabilities increases a country’s vulnerability to grey-zone threats and covert deployments. For instance, recent Chinese hydrographic activities in the Maldives, including visits by survey vessels and agreements related to seabed monitoring and oceanographic data collection, have raised concerns. Given China’s past use of such data for sea-denial strategies in the South China Sea, and the Maldives’s lack of independent space-based surveillance, it cannot independently verify what the vessel is actually doing underwater.
The dependence on externally sourced data further increases the states’ vulnerabilities. Major powers or private corporations may manipulate delivery timelines, prioritize certain clients over others or selectively delay data for commercial or political gain. Ukraine’s reliance on SpaceX’s Starlink during its ongoing war with Russia illustrates this risk. In 2023, a request to extend coverage for a drone operation near Crimea was reportedly denied. This incident illustrated how control over space-based services can directly shape operational outcomes.
Put together, the emerging space divide has far-reaching implications. It determines who can detect threats and who can respond in real time. It also shapes the dynamics of competition and cooperation, as data-sharing becomes both a diplomatic tool and an instrument of coercion.
Against this backdrop, diversification offers a pragmatic pathway for South Asian littorals to reduce overdependence on any single external actor. Sri Lanka and the Maldives have already begun expanding their external engagements. At the regional level, minilateral frameworks such as the Colombo Security Conclave and the Indian Ocean Regional Association can serve as platforms for shared access to maritime data and other surveillance infrastructures. This can reduce asymmetries in the region and limit the scope for external manipulation.
Meanwhile, India, in its role as a preferred security partner, should focus not only on capacity building but also on shaping norms for responsible behavior. Ultimately, the future of maritime security in the Indian Ocean will be defined not by control of sea lanes alone, but by the ability to monitor, interpret and act in real time.
