India’s forgotten role? Rethinking Bangladesh’s strategic priorities
By aligning with India’s adversaries, Bangladesh is playing a dangerous game of short-term gain and long-term risk. Strategic memory must not be replaced with strategic amnesia.
In recent years, Bangladesh appears to have drifted away from the very foundations that shaped its emergence as an independent nation. One cannot ignore the undeniable role India played in 1971—sheltering over 10 million refugees, offering critical military assistance, and even postponing its own Five-Year Plan to meet the urgent needs of the Bengali population. India diverted significant national resources to provide food, shelter, and medical aid during a time of internal economic strain. India’s support wasn’t transactional; it was moral, strategic, and humanitarian.
Yet today, those sacrifices and the spirit of 1971 seem to be fading from Bangladesh’s national memory, as it increasingly embraces countries that once stood against its very creation and now seek to undermine India’s interests in the region. Recently, India’s Deputy Army Chief, Lt Gen Rahul R Singh, made a striking revelation about the recent India–Pakistan clashes: “We had one border and two adversaries—actually three. Pakistan was the front face. China was providing all possible support… Turkey also played an important role in providing the type of support it did. When DGMO-level talks were on, Pakistan was getting live inputs of our deployment from China.”
These revelations underscored a troubling triad—China, Pakistan, and Turkey—working in tandem to undermine India’s strategic interests. Despite this, Dhaka has shown increasing comfort in expanding defense and intelligence cooperation with these very powers.
From historic brotherhood to strategic drift
Recently in July 2025, Turkey’s top defense official, HalukGorgun, visited Dhaka and met with Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser, Mohammed Yunus, and senior military leadership to discuss deeper strategic collaboration. This was the second such high-level engagement within a year, accompanied by discussions around establishing joint defense-industrial complexes in Chittagong and Narayanganj. This builds on Bangladesh’s previous procurement of Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones, MKE howitzers, and rocket systems. Earlier in the year, Bangladeshi officials also visited Turkish defense facilities, indicating sustained intent to deepen ties.
India’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, has openly warned of the emerging China–Pakistan–Bangladesh strategic axis. He stated, “There is a possible convergence of interest we can talk about between China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh that may have implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.” The growing alignment of Dhaka with powers openly hostile to India raises difficult questions—particularly when mutual cooperation, historical proximity, and regional peace should ideally guide bilateral relations. Bangladesh’s leadership must reflect on whether such alignments serve its long-term national interest, or whether they risk undoing the very legacy that brought the nation into existence.
India would have no objection if Bangladesh sought geoeconomic partnerships or diversified its trade relations. Every sovereign country has that right. But what raises concerns is the deepening engagement with states whose strategic postures are clearly inimical to India. China’s strategic intent to exploit India’s Siliguri Corridor, Pakistan’s sustained pursuit of an anti-India agenda, and Turkey’s growing activism in South Asia—often in strategic alignment with Pakistan—are well documented.
Surprisingly, Bangladesh is facilitating these inroads. And when Indian media flags these developments, Dhaka accuses it of “propaganda.” But isn’t it a basic responsibility of any nation to ensure that its territory is not used, directly or indirectly, to harm the interests of its neighbours—especially a country like India, which stood by Bangladesh in its hour of need?
Often, criticism is directed at India for “supporting” Sheikh Hasina or for “interfering” in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. But the reality is simple: Sheikh Hasina was the elected leader of Bangladesh, and India, as a responsible neighbour, engaged with her government—as it would with any legitimate leadership in Dhaka. India’s only expectation has been that its core security interests, particularly in the Northeast, are respected. The Awami League government had been sensitive to these concerns, while the BNP and others have often taken positions hostile to India’s strategic and territorial interests.
The current leadership in Bangladesh appears to be taking an immature and ideologically confused path—eschewing pragmatic diplomacy for populist rhetoric and short-term strategic alignments. Despite global interest in engaging with India due to its rising economic potential and geopolitical weight, Bangladesh seems to be isolating itself regionally by antagonizing the very partner that could offer it the greatest long-term benefits.
Even groups considered traditionally hostile to India—like the Taliban—have reiterated that their territory will not be used against India. The Taliban’s deputy spokesperson, Hamdullah Fitrat, stated: “The caretaker government is committed to a policy of neutrality and does not permit the use of Afghan soil against any country, including India.” Similarly, Sri Lanka’s newly elected Marxist president, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, has repeatedly assured Prime Minister Narendra Modi: “We will not allow our land to be used in any way in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of India.” He further described India’s friendship as “the shield of a true friend.” In stark contrast, the current government in Dhaka seems to be ignoring such diplomatic principles.
Economic indicators in Bangladesh have not improved post-regime change. In fact, many would argue they’ve worsened. The promises of a new revolution have given way to a reality eerily reminiscent of George Orwell’s Animal Farm—where one elite replaces another, only to continue the same flawed governance, sometimes in an even more opaque and self-serving manner.
India doesn’t wish to interfere in Bangladesh’s domestic politics. It simply seeks credible assurances—backed by concrete actions—that its own national security and strategic interests will not be compromised. The hostility Bangladesh is cultivating may bring momentary tactical advantages or external applause, but it will ultimately deepen insecurity and compel Dhaka to divert its limited resources toward managing avoidable tensions.
A pragmatic, forward-looking leadership in Bangladesh would do well to pursue deeper engagement with New Delhi—acknowledging the reality of shared geography, mutual economic interdependence, and regional peace. Bangladesh has a long border with India, historical ties, and a unique opportunity to grow together with its neighbour rather than against it.
Even in the past, leaders like the Maldives’ President Mohamed Muizzu—who initially adopted a confrontational approach toward India—eventually recognized the geopolitical and geoeconomic rationale for resetting ties.
Muizzu had come to power on an “India-Out” platform, demanded the withdrawal of Indian military personnel, and prioritized visits to China and Turkey. However, faced with growing economic challenges and strategic realities, he recalibrated his approach. By mid-2024, he engaged with New Delhi, attended Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in ceremony, and welcomed Indian financial assistance through a currency swap arrangement and loan rollovers. He publicly acknowledged India as a key development partner. Bangladesh can do the same. Nothing is lost. A mature and mutually respectful partnership with India remains possible—and desirable.
Bangladesh must stop aligning itself with powers that seek to destabilize South Asia. Instead, it should embrace a foreign policy rooted in realism, cooperation, and regional stability. Good relations with India are not just in India’s interest—they are vital for Bangladesh’s own development, security, and prosperity.
Let us not forget: India and Bangladesh are not just neighbours—they are civilizational partners. It is in the interest of both nations, and especially of the Bangladeshi people, to preserve and strengthen that relationship.
Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, the Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
