India’s struggles in South Asia amid rising Chinese influence

India’s role as a regional power in South Asia has long been a topic of debate, as it navigates the complex dynamics of diplomacy, geography, and historical relationships with its neighbors. The recent visit of Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu to India, his first since assuming office, alongside Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s outreach to Sri Lanka’s newly elected president Anura Kumara Dissanayake, marks a concerted effort by India to recalibrate its regional strategy. These moves are reflective of India’s broader attempt to counter unfavorable shifts in its relationships with neighboring countries, which have been increasingly influenced by anti-India sentiment and rising Chinese influence.

Since 2024, India has experienced significant setbacks in its diplomatic relations across South Asia. Countries that have historically been aligned with New Delhi are now adopting a more independent stance, driven by a combination of domestic political changes and the growing strategic allure of China. The challenges facing India’s regional diplomacy can be attributed to two primary factors: its long-standing “China-centric mind-set” and its “hegemonic attitude” toward its smaller neighbors. These barriers have not only hindered India’s ability to foster stronger relations but have also opened the door for other global powers, particularly China, to expand their influence in South Asia.

In the Maldives, President Muizzu’s election marked a significant shift in the island nation’s foreign policy. His predecessor, Ibrahim Solih, pursued an “India First” policy, which prioritized close ties with New Delhi. However, Muizzu has taken a different approach, making China his first official foreign visit and calling for the withdrawal of Indian military personnel stationed in the Maldives. This move has further strained India’s relations with the Maldives, a country it considers strategically important for maintaining its influence in the Indian Ocean.

Similarly, Bangladesh, which has long been a key ally of India in the region, is now embroiled in political turmoil that has made it increasingly difficult for New Delhi to strengthen ties with the interim government. India’s relationship with Dhaka has been complicated by growing anti-India sentiment, driven in part by perceptions of India’s interference in Bangladesh’s domestic affairs. This sentiment has manifested in protests and political opposition that question India’s role in the country’s development and governance.

Sri Lanka, too, poses a significant challenge to India’s regional diplomacy. The election of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, a Marxist politician with close ties to left-wing and anti-imperialist movements, complicates India’s efforts to maintain its influence on the island. Dissanayake’s political platform, which emphasizes greater independence from foreign powers and a more assertive economic policy, could reduce India’s leverage in Sri Lanka, especially as Colombo seeks closer ties with Beijing to address its ongoing economic crisis.

At the heart of India’s diplomatic struggles in South Asia is its fixation on countering China’s growing influence. Over the past decade, Indian policymakers have increasingly framed their foreign policy toward South Asia in terms of limiting Beijing’s strategic advances. This “China-centric” approach has led to initiatives like the “Neighbors First” policy, the “Act East” policy, and the “Connect Central Asia” strategy. While these initiatives have aimed to enhance India’s role in the region, they have largely been reactive, focusing on preventing China from deepening ties with India’s neighbors rather than promoting India’s own interests through genuine regional cooperation.

The most glaring example of this reactive diplomacy is India’s handling of the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) initiative. Initially conceived as a framework for promoting regional connectivity and economic integration, BBIN has become more about countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) than fostering genuine cooperation. New Delhi’s obsession with Beijing’s influence has overshadowed its ability to advance its own strategic goals, leaving many South Asian countries skeptical of India’s intentions.

This dynamic has been further exacerbated by India’s use of economic pressure to maintain its influence in the region. India has often leveraged its geographic and economic advantages to exert influence over its smaller neighbors, using trade and energy supply dependencies as tools of “coercive diplomacy.” However, this approach has backfired, driving many countries in South Asia to seek alternatives to their reliance on India. China has capitalized on this by offering infrastructure development, loans, and trade partnerships through the BRI, providing these countries with more diverse and reliable supply chain networks.

As India’s diplomatic challenges mount, the Modi administration has shown signs of adopting a more conciliatory stance toward its neighbors. Jaishankar’s recent visits to Sri Lanka and the Maldives indicate a willingness to engage diplomatically and mend strained relations. However, these efforts may be too little, too late if India does not fundamentally change its approach to regional diplomacy.

India’s biggest challenge lies in overcoming its “hegemonic attitude” toward South Asia. For decades, New Delhi has viewed the region as its natural “sphere of influence,” a perspective that has led to a paternalistic approach in its dealings with neighbors. This mindset has fostered resentment, as countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives seek greater independence in their foreign policy choices. If India continues to operate under this assumption of regional dominance, it risks further alienating its neighbors and pushing them closer to China.

To regain its influence, India must prioritize the development of a proactive and constructive regional cooperation strategy. This means moving away from a purely reactive stance toward China and focusing on initiatives that promote mutual economic growth, infrastructure development, and regional stability. India’s soft power potential, rooted in its shared cultural and historical ties with South Asia, remains strong, but it must be harnessed through a more inclusive and collaborative approach.

India’s diplomatic challenges in South Asia are a reflection of deeper structural issues within its foreign policy. If New Delhi is to reclaim its leadership role in the region, it must abandon its China-centric mind-set and hegemonic tendencies, opting instead for a more constructive and cooperative approach to regional diplomacy. Only then can India build lasting partnerships and counter the rising influence of external powers in its own backyard.