India’s red-carpet reception for Vladimir Putin this week has sent ripples through Washington. The optics were impossible to ignore: As the Russian president openly threatened Europe – warning that Moscow was “ready” should the continent provoke conflict – New Delhi celebrated his visit as proof of strategic autonomy.

From the vantage point of a Trump administration, India’s ability to maintain cordial relations with a power actively undermining Western security is less a diplomatic feat than a strategic problem. It raises a fundamental question: Can India still be America’s indispensable Indo-Pacific pillar when it signals, through action and optics, that Western priorities are secondary?

For two decades, US policy toward India was guided by a blend of pragmatism and optimism. Washington sought a rising India – economically dynamic, militarily capable and strategically positioned to counterbalance China. India’s enduring ties with Russia, long treated as “legacy” issues, were tolerated because the benefits of a cooperative New Delhi appeared to outweigh the costs.

But global circumstances have shifted dramatically. Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, its belligerent rhetoric toward Europe and its deepening partnership with China create a geopolitical landscape in which India’s hedging is no longer easily accommodated.

In international relations, states act to ensure survival and security, treating alliances as instruments rather than moral commitments. Trump administration reads India’s Moscow engagement through this lens. The question is not whether India has the right to conduct independent diplomacy, but whether India is acting to strengthen or undermine collective Western security interests.

By publicly hosting a leader threatening Europe with destruction, India undermines the credibility of the West’s strategic posture. In realist terms, India becomes a partner whose alignment cannot be assumed in times of crisis.

This logic naturally leads to balance-of-power thinking. If one state cannot be fully relied upon to support collective measures against a revisionist power, the rational response is to hedge – diversify partnerships and distribute influence so that no single actor holds disproportionate sway over regional outcomes.

From Washington’s perspective, India’s selective alignment may be insufficient to deter Russian adventurism or to guarantee the integrity of Indo-Pacific security architecture. Alternative pathways, including deeper engagement with Bangladesh or Sri Lanka or recalibration with Pakistan, are not opportunistic gambits but necessary adjustments to preserve strategic equilibrium.

Trump’s worldview amplifies this concern. He prizes transactional clarity: Partners must “choose,” and hedging is treated as ambiguity – often interpreted as implicit defection.

In this environment, India’s claim to strategic autonomy is read less as sophisticated diplomacy and more as a warning sign that US strategic expectations may not be met. Hosting Putin in such a context is not a minor irritant; it is a visible challenge to the assumptions underpinning US policy in South Asia.

The symbolism matters. India’s continued embrace of Russia demonstrates that New Delhi is pursuing national interests independently of – and occasionally at odds with – the collective interests of democratic powers in the Indo-Pacific. The US cannot simply rely on India’s good will or assume alignment in critical contingencies. Reliability is measured in action, not rhetoric.

The consequences for South Asia are significant. If Washington downgrades India’s centrality in regional strategy, smaller states – Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and even Nepal – gain leverage as alternative partners in diplomacy, trade and security arrangements.

Pakistan, long sidelined in US strategic calculations, is already receiving renewed attention as Washington seeks multiple points of influence to balance both China and a less predictable India.

Afghanistan, still volatile, becomes an arena where US strategic engagement cannot rely solely on India as a stabilizing influence.

In essence, India’s actions risk fragmenting the very coalition the US has relied on to secure South Asian stability, creating a more diffuse and uncertain regional order.

This recalibration does not spell the end of the US–India partnership. The structural imperatives of the Indo-Pacific – countering China’s expansion, ensuring maritime security, fostering economic linkages – remain compelling.

But the relationship will be increasingly conditional, assessed through the lens of reliability, commitment and alignment with shared security objectives. India’s hedging reduces its strategic premium and introduces risk into the American calculus.

India may argue that its ties with Russia are historical and pragmatic. Yet, in the current environment, such distinctions carry diminishing weight. The United States, guided by realist prudence and balance-of-power logic, is compelled to hedge, diversify and ensure that Indo-Pacific strategy does not hinge on a partner whose priorities diverge from its own.

Hosting Putin at a time of Russian escalation signals that India’s alignment is transactional and contingent – a position Washington cannot rely upon in moments of high-stakes decision-making.

Putin’s visit, therefore, is both a symbol and a stress test. Symbolically, it reinforces India’s self-image as a strategic autonomous power. Practically, it tests US assumptions about India’s reliability, credibility, and willingness to prioritize collective security.

In a system defined by anarchy, competition and the necessity of credible commitments, hedging against the West carries costs. Strategic clarity, not rhetoric, determines influence.

India still has the potential to be a central pillar of Indo-Pacific strategy, but potential alone is insufficient. If Delhi continues to prioritize Russian ties over Western expectations, Washington will adapt – exploring partnerships with other South Asian actors, recalibrating trust, and reducing reliance on a single, increasingly unpredictable partner.

In short, the strategic architecture of South Asia – and India’s role within it – is in flux. New Delhi may believe it can balance Moscow and Washington indefinitely, but the logic of balance-of-power politics suggests that such equidistance carries risks that may now be unavoidable.

Advocate Mazhar Siddique Khan is a Lahore-based High Court lawyer. He can be contacted at [email protected].