Photo courtesy of Ceylon Today

As a country seeking to address the legacy of its past war and armed conflicts, Sri Lanka must roll back the overbroad and dangerous laws that have been repeatedly abused to the detriment of its citizens. The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 (PTA), which has wreaked havoc in the lives of Sri Lankans, particularly minority communities, for 45 years, is the most emblematic of these laws. Successive governments have been under domestic1 and international2 pressure to repeal this draconian law.

In September 2018, the Yahapalanaya government gazetted a Counter-Terrorism Act (CTA) to replace the PTA, and in March 2023, the SLPP government under President Ranil Wickremesinghe gazetted an Anti- Terrorism Act (ATA) and thereafter gazetted another version in September that same year (September 2023 ATA). These draft laws were widely criticized for the risks they posed to civil and political rights and were never enacted by parliament. The draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), published on the Ministry of Justice website in December 2025, is the latest attempt by a government of Sri Lanka to repeal and replace the PTA.

With the draft PSTA, the National People’s Power (NPP) government has demonstrated an interest in retaining wide executive powers to be deployed against conduct considered to be “terrorism” under the act. Regrettably, as is common in Sri Lankan lawmaking, this draft PSTA was not accompanied by any background paper that sets out the context that justifies its provisions.

Scheme of the PSTA

The draft PSTA presents a scheme of law that, inter alia

1. Creates a broad range of offences of terrorism and offences related to terrorism,
2. Maintains and expands extraordinary arrest and detention powers,
3. Makes provision for  arange of investigation powers for thepolice,
4. Attempts to bestow on the Attorney General power to compel admissions of guilt, and
5. Creates a scheme of broad powers for the president to declare proscribed organizations and curfews, for Deputy Inspector Generals and above to apply for restriction orders, for the Secretary to the Minister of Defence to declare places as prohibited places and for the introduction of “rehabilitation” programs for those not convicted of any offence.

A brief review of the provisions of the proposed PSTA demonstrates that the scheme is similar to the previous government’s ATA and that this draft law fails to fundamentally address the issue of broadly defining the offence of terrorism and having a parallel system of police power for offences of terrorism.

As the title suggests, like that of the PTA, the fundamental purpose of the proposed law is to protect the state and by extension the sitting government. As such, it lacks a people-centric framing, which would focus on violence against civilians, emphasizing protection of human life and ensuring safety. Such a framing might have offered resistance to public dissent, political disruption and threats to political power being treated as acts of terrorism in and of themselves.

The preamble to the draft PSTA reminds us that Sri Lanka is committed to the protection of public safety, the principles of the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the rights to liberty, security of the person, fair trial and freedom from arbitrary detention under international human rights instruments. However, several provisions in the draft undermine these objectives and appear inconsistent with fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

The draft PSTA appears to have removed language that was previously seen in the September 2023 ATA on powers to explicitly prohibit congregations, meetings, rallies or processions. It has introduced carve out provisions to exclude protest, advocacy or dissent or engagement in any strike, lockout or other industrial action from attracting the powers of this law. However, these carveout provisions may be at odds with other aspects of the definition (i.e. compelling the state) and risk being overridden in practice.

There are several provisions purporting to ensure safeguards for suspects such as judicial supervision over the person arrested or detained, assurances of humane conditions in detention centres, visits to detention centres by judicial officials and the Human Rights Commission, arrests with “due regard to privacy”, right to visits by family and an attorney at law. Decades of experience, however, show that these safeguards are not easy to secure. When safeguards are flouted, significant resources are required to obtain a remedy, such as moving the Supreme Court to review such abuses of power.

The much criticized “confessions clause” in the PTA has been omitted. However, the PSTA does propose to grant potentially coercive powers to the Attorney General through a mechanism of deferment of prosecution upon an agreement with the suspect.

This draft law continues the scheme of granting overly broad powers to the Executive. A significant concern is also the several provisions on investigative powers allowing the police to apply for orders from a magistrate to obtain information from banks, financial institutions, to obtain information from service providers and to authorise unlocking data and information. Traditionally, judicial oversight is constrained by the sense of urgency, confidentiality and potential cost to human life and safety of the state, that the term “terrorism” attracts. The consideration given to terrorism-related requests will potentially shape judicial decisions when balancing citizens’ rights to privacy against public security imperatives.

Rather than use an ordinary criminal law regime for offences of terrorism in tandem with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, the PSTA follows the PTA in giving rise to parallel criminal jurisdictions and contains the same potential for abuse of power without meaningful checks or review.

The PSTA, if enacted, contains powers that may be potentially used by state actors against legitimate and peaceful activities of citizens, including civil society activists, human rights defenders, journalists, minorities and others, to suppress dissent.

Some key features of the PSTA are discussed in further detail below:

     1.  Expanded definition of terrorism

A law which removes ordinary safeguards of the criminal justice system must be precise about the circumstances in and the offences to which it can be applied. It does so to reduce chances of it being abused and used in ways that are unjust. This is why the definition of terrorism must be clear and precise.

The definition in the PSTA fails the UN guidelines

The UN Special Rapporteur on Counter Terrorism and Human Rights has recommended that attempts to define terrorism must have the following components:

1. Defined acts (described as “trigger offences” found in 10 of the anti-terrorism conventions in force) and
2. Part 1 intention – to cause death, serious bodily injury, or taking hostages and
3. Part 2 intention – purpose of invoking a  stateof terror/intimidating a population/compelling a government or international organization to do or refrain from doing an act. Both parts of the intention must be present to ensure that the offence reaches the threshold of defining terrorism.

The PSTA defines terrorist offences as:

1. Defined acts – any act which causes a consequence of death of a person; hurt; hostage-taking; abduction or kidnapping; serious damage to any place of public use, any public property; committing the offence of robbery, extortion or theft; serious risk to the health and safety of the public; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic or automated or computerised system; the destruction of, or serious damage to, religious or cultural property; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with any electronic, analogue, digital or other wire-linked or wireless transmission system; importing, exporting, manufacturing, collecting, obtaining, supplying, trafficking, possessing or using firearms, article used in explosives, or biological, chemical, electric, electronic or nuclear weapon, other nuclear explosive device, or any offence described in any of the nine international treatise on terrorism ratified by Sri Lanka and
2. Intentions – intentionally or knowingly, for the purpose of – (a)provoking a state of terror; (b) intimidating the public or any section of the public; (c) compelling the Government of Sri Lanka, or any other Government, or an international organisation, to do or to abstain from doing any act; or (d) propagating war, or violating territorial integrity or infringing the sovereignty of Sri Lanka or any other sovereign country.

The PSTA fails to narrowly define the offence of terrorism, as international norms require, and instead include a long list of actions that do not meet the threshold for “trigger offences” internationally recognised.

The PSTA also fails the requirement of cumulative intention – that (a) only acts committed with the intention of causing death, serious bodily injury or taking hostage and (b) the intention to invoke a state of terror or intimidating a population or compelling a government, will be considered the high threshold for the intention required of the offence.

Unlike the PTA, which did not require an intention in conjunction with the committing of acts, the PSTA (much like the CTA and both versions of the ATA) requires an intention. While international law requires two types of intentions, the PSTA, in terms of Clause 3(1) only requires any one of four intentions – committing an act intentionally or knowingly for the purpose of (a) provoking a state of terror; (b) intimidating the public or any section of the public; (c) compelling the Government of Sri Lanka, or any other Government, or an international organisation, to do or to abstain from doing any act; or (d) propagating war, or violating territorial integrity or infringing the sovereignty of Sri Lanka or any other sovereign country. Intention (c) is extremely broad and could be attributed to a wide range of legitimate civic and political actions by citizens.

The PSTA defines 13 specific acts as acts of terrorism including serious damage to any place of public use, any public property, theft of private property, and causing the destruction of, or serious damage to, religious or cultural property (Clause 3(2)). Many of these would not qualify as acts of terrorism under international norms. The PSTA is also applicable to any act of terrorism as defined in 9 of the international conventions ratified by Sri Lanka in the First Schedule of the Act. Interestingly, the acts of murder and grievous hurt which were acts identified in the September 2023 ATA have been replaced by the acts of causing “the death of a person” and “hurt”, acts with lesser thresholds in law. Obstruction of essential services and being a member of an unlawful assembly for the commission of any act have been removed from the September 2023 ATA as acts that could be acts of terrorism.

The acts/consequences listed in Clause 3(2) which make up the definition of an “offence of terrorism”, read together with Clause 3(1), completely fail international human rights standards. Many of these acts are offences under the ordinary criminal law and reframing those same acts as ‘terrorist offences’ creates the possibility of using terror laws to police ordinary criminal acts, as demonstrated by the abuse of the PTA.

Additional vague and overbroad offences have been recognized under the PSTA, as shown below:

•  “Offences associated with a proscribed terrorist organisation” includes acts such as “engages in any transaction with”, “causes the dissemination of information on behalf of”, “promotes, encourages, supports, advises, assists, or acts on behalf of”(Clause 6 of the PSTA). The September 2023 ATA had 3 types of conduct that it categorized as associated offences, whilst the PSTA includes 15 very broad types of conduct. The PTA did not have such acts categorized as terrorism offences. Lawyers providing advice have been excepted, yet journalists, medical professionals, academics and others may be accused and charged of providing advice to or support for ideas associated with a proscribed organization.
•  “Acts associated with terrorism” (Clause 8) – prevents, hinders or interferes with the identification, arrest, custody or detention of a person who is believed to have committed or is “concerned in” committing an offence, or gathers or supplies confidential information believing it to be used to commit, attempt or prepare for an offence.
•  “Encouragement of terrorism” (Clause 9) – encouraging or inducing the public or any section of the public, to commit, attempt, abet, conspire to commit or prepare to commit, the offence of terrorism, publishes or causes to be published any statement, or speaks any word or words, or makes any sign or visible representation, or recklessly publishes or causes to be published any statement, or speaks any word or words, or makes any sign or visible representation. Includes both direct or indirect encouragement or inducement etc.
•  “Dissemination of terrorist publications” (Clause 10) – with intention/knowledge of directly or indirectly encouraging terrorism (Clause 10(1)) and / or being reckless to encourage terrorism (Clause 10(2)): (a) distributes or circulates a terrorist publication; (b) gives, sells or lends a terrorist publication; (c) offers for sale a terrorist publication; (d) provides a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to or look at a terrorist publication or to acquire it; (e) transmits the contents of a terrorist publication; or (f) keeps a terrorist publication in his possession. There are carve out provisions (Clause 11) for anything published in good faith with due diligence for the benefit of the public or in the national interest; or any opinion, legitimate criticism, satire, parody, caution or imputation made in good faith. In practice this may not protect from arbitrary arrest and may only be useful to bring matters to the notice of a judicial officer after being arrested, remanded or detained.
•  Training for “terrorism” (Clause 12); and
•  Failure to provide information about any offence or preparation of an attempt to commit an offence (Clause 15). This creates an exceptionally wide net, given that offences under the PSTA are so broad.

The range of offences created under the PSTA are extensive, completely unwarranted and will likely cause much harm. PSTA is not consistent with international standards as the wording of offences fundamentally introduces a very low threshold for acts identified as terrorism. It dangerously widens the definition of terrorism to potentially include entirely legitimate speech, journalism, and democratic political actions. By design, it is highly susceptible to abuse. The definition empowers state officials to term acts of dissent and civil disobedience as ‘terrorism’ and will lawfully permit disproportionate and excessive responses.

The definition in the PSTA will give license for the state to treat as terrorism acts such as the following:

• Citizens protesting against state such as in the cases of Rathupaswala and state involvement in water pollution, Rambukkana state action impacting fuel distribution, Meethotamulla state decision to dump garbage in their neighborhood, impact of development projects by state action such as urban evictions, eviction and forceful use of plantation lands, projects such as establishment of industrial development zones which incite citizens to protest, and demanding release of lands occupied by the military.
• Mass civic protests and public civil disobedience actions (like the anti coup protests of 2018 and aragalaya of 2022).
•  Critique deemed harmful to national interest (arrests and prosecutions like that of Tissainayagam who was alleged of inciting communal hatred and collecting money for his publication), Azath Sally (whose criticisms of the BBS were allegedly incitements to racial disharmony) and the 27 year old Ahnaf, who was detained for over year after being accused of “teaching and the publication of books on racism and extremism to students” for his book of poetry.
•  Actions of human rights defenders (like arrest and detention of Ruki Fernando and Fr. Praveen when they were visiting families of the disappeared) and lawyers (such as in the instance of the arrest and detention of Hejaaz Hisbullah).

A carve out clause introduces the idea that a person who engages in any protest, advocacy or dissent or engages in any strike, lockout or other industrial action, is not to be, by such act itself, considered to be engaging in an act of terrorism (Clause 3(4)). However, as mentioned earlier, the tension between this exception and the criterion of intent to compel the state may not protect these civic and political rights in practice.

2. Extraordinary arrest and detention powers continue

Clause 20 of the PTSA empowers armed forces and coast guard personnel to stop, search, question, enter and search premises or land, and take into custody any document, thing or article, “used, derived out of, connected with or concerned in committing or reasonably suspected of being used, derived out of, connected with, or concerned in committing an offence” under the Act. Given the excessively broad range of acts that are deemed to be “terrorism” under the PSTA, granting these broad powers to armed forces or the coast guard is dangerous.

The PSTA continues to empower the executive to restrict physical liberty for extended periods of time without full judicial review in the name of “detention orders”. Issuance of Detention Orders (DO) is an extraordinary power. The ordinary criminal law system with all its protections is the best possible scheme to respond to offences, particularly the broad range of acts that the PSTA seeks to call “terrorism”. There is no justification whatsoever to have detention without judicial review.

In the proposed PSTA, Clause 26(1) requires a suspect to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 48 hours of arrest. The Magistrate may extend custody for a further 24 hours (Clause 26(2)). If a Detention Order (DO) is produced, the Magistrate shall give effect to it. If a Detention Order is not produced, based on an application made by the police, the Magistrate may remand or release on bail (Clause 26(3)(b)). The Magistrate has no power to release a suspect upon review, even if they consider their detention to be unsupported. The Magistrate is required by this law to consider if the person has been subject to torture and may direct the person for medical treatment, for a medical examination and can make an order to change the place of detention (Clause 27).

The draft sets out a maximum period of 1 year of remand and maximum period of 2 years of remand and detention combined without charge (Clause 28). If these periods have been exceeded, and no indictment has been served, the Magistrate may release a person on bail (Clause 28(3)). There is no power given to the Magistrate to free the detained person, even in the absence of adequate material to support a detention.

Detention Orders are to be issued by the Secretary to the Ministry (Clause 29(2)). Detention Orders must be applied for in writing by the IGP or a DIG authorized by the IGP (Clause 29(1)). Detention Orders would be permitted by this law for reasons of (a) facilitating the conduct of the investigation in respect of the suspect; (b) to obtain material for an investigation and potential evidence relating to the commission of an offence under this Act; (c) to question the suspect in detention; or (d) to preserve evidence pertaining to the commission of an offence under this Act. (Clause 29(3)).

Clause 30 provides for creation of “approved places of detention”, which are essentially detention sites under the supervision of the police that do not fall under the judicial or prisons system. Such detention sites have a history related to torture in Sri Lanka. This practice is contrary to the basic principles of criminal law that are aimed to prevent torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. There is no reason for a suspect to be in the custody of the investigators. Once transferred to the remand system, which is under judicial supervision, there is a separation of interests that theoretically and practically keeps the suspect safe from coercion and abuse, whilst investigations may continue.

Clause 31 provides for Magistrates to visit detention centers. Although practically this is even possible under existing law, it hardly ever happens due to workload. If conditions within the centers are not “humane”, the Human Rights Commission or the Magistrate may inform the IGP (Clause 32).

The initial detention of two months may only be extended with the approval of the Magistrate (Clause 35). The Magistrate is to consider material under confidential cover, may refuse to disclose such information to the suspect because the investigation may be affected, and may hear the Attorney at Law for the suspect (Clauses 35(3) and (4)). The Magistrate is empowered to remand the suspect or release the suspect on bail (Clause 35(7)(b)). Investigations are to be completed without unnecessary delay (Clause 36), however no period has been stipulated and once investigations are completed a report is to be submitted to the Magistrate (Clause 36(2)). If the report does not disclose an allegation against the suspect, the Magistrate may discharge the suspect (Clause 36(3). However, it is rarely the situation that an allegation of an offence is not disclosed, experience with cases in the past where far-fetched and unsupported allegations have been made against suspects resulting in their detention. It is whether the evidence gathered after investigations supports the allegations made that determines if a suspect is eventually released. As such, this scheme allows for the police to influence the length of detention and remand well over the time limits stipulated and without due reason.

Clause 37 requires suspects under detention to be produced before the Magistrate every 14 days. Considering the suspect goes back into the custody of the police, this is no real check on the power of the police to intimidate a suspect.

Clause 39 introduces a curious and very dangerous power. It allows a suspect in remand (judicial custody) to be taken back into detention (police custody). If an OIC receives credible information that the suspect has committed an offence, has attempted an offence or engaged in preparatory acts, or has committed an offence prior to arrest, a High Court judge on an application by the Attorney General may give effect to a detention order (Clause 39(2)). It appears that the suspect can only be so detained for a maximum period of three months. The grave potential for abuse of this power to coerce suspects is obvious.

3. Creates conditions whereby the Attorney General can compel persons into admitting guilt and accepting punishment without conviction

Clause 56 of the proposed PSTA (similar to Clause 71 of the ATA) states that the Attorney General may suspend and defer the institution of criminal proceedings against such person alleged to have committed an offence under this Act in certain circumstances, for a period not exceeding twenty years. While the power has been made contingent on “prior approval” between the Attorney General and suspect, it is extremely problematic that this “plea bargaining” type situation is created without clear process that entitles the suspect to information on available evidence and frees the suspect of fears of prolonged litigation if they were to choose to defend themselves against any charge in pursuit of be acquitted. The AG is empowered to obtain the sanction of the High Court to impose one or more of the following conditions for such suspension/deferment: Publicly express remorse and apology using a text issued by the AG, provide reparation to victims, participate in rehabilitation, publicly undertake to refrain from committing an offence, engage in community or social service, refrain from committing an offence or breach of peace (Clause 56(3)). This type of provision essentially places undue pressure on persons to admit guilt in the hopes of not having to be detained for a long period or go through a long legal process under the terror law.

This clause read together with Clause 72(2) permits persons to be placed in ‘rehabilitation’ programs without having been convicted of any offence, and merely by virtue of the Attorney General deferring institution of criminal proceedings or suspension of prosecution against such person. This is essentially granting power to punish without affording a trial. Given the high susceptibility for abuse of this law and the broad definition of terrorism makes it is very likely that persons who have been arrested without cause may be compelled to consent to rehabilitation to secure their freedom.

4. Continued power of the executive to declare “proscribed organizations”, “restriction orders”, curfew orders and prohibited places

Proscription orders by the president are provided for by Clause 63 of the proposed PSTA (similar to Clause 79 of the September 2023 ATA). Where the President has reasonable grounds to believe that any organization is engaged in any act amounting to an offence under this Act or is acting in an unlawful manner prejudicial to the national security of Sri Lanka or any other country, the President can by order published in the Gazette declare an organization or movement as proscribed. Proscription orders contain prohibitions such as prohibiting any person being a member of such organization; prohibiting such organization recruiting members to such organization; prohibiting any person acting in furtherance of the objectives of such organization; prohibition on conducting meetings, activities and programmes by such organization; prohibition on the use or mobilization of bank accounts and other financial depositories of such organization; prohibition to entering into contracts; prohibition on raising of funds and receiving grants and bequests; prohibition to transferring funds and assets of the organization; prohibition for lobbying and canvassing on behalf of such organization; or prohibiting any person by publication of any material in furtherance of the objects of such organization. Clause 63(6) states that a Proscription Order made under this section shall remain valid until rescinded, which provision is more egregious than the similar provision in the September 2023 ATA (Clause 79(7)).

Restriction orders are provided for by Clause 64 of the proposed PSTA. A Deputy Inspector General of Police or higher ranking officer is empowered to apply to the Magistrate Court to obtain a restriction order. (In the September 2023 ATA the application was to be by the President and order made by the High Court – Clause 80).

A Restriction Order made under subsection (1) may include restrictions on – (a) the movement outside the place of residence; (b) travelling within Sri Lanka; (c) travelling overseas; (d) travelling outside the normal route between the place of residence and place of employment; (e) the communication or association, or both, with particular persons as shall be specified in the Order; (f) engaging in certain specified activities that may facilitate the commission of an offence under this Act or (g) visiting any place specified in the Order (Clause 64(3)). (the last order (g) was not in the September 2023 ATA).

The restriction order may require the suspect to report to any police station on a specified date, or at specified periodic intervals. (Clause 64(4) of the PSTA).

The restriction order is to be for a period of one month and the aggregate period is not to exceed six months (Clause 64(9)). The magistrate is to review the order every month and extend if necessary (Clause 64(8) PSTA).

It is notable that in the September 2023 ATA there were purported safeguards in Clause 80(4) – of the order (a) being necessary for the prevention of the commission of an offence under this Act; (b) being necessary to conduct investigations into the commission of an offence under this Act; (c) being proportionate to the offence alleged to have committed or likely to be committed under this Act; and (d) not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty or restriction on the exercise of fundamental rights, in terms of the provisions of the Constitution. However, no similar safeguards have been included under Clause 64 of the proposed PSTA.

The president is empowered to order curfew by Order published in the Gazette for the ‘protection and maintenance of national security, public security, public order or public safety.’ (Clause 65 of the PSTA). The orders are to be for twenty four hours with a minimum of a three hour interval between curfews. The penalty for violating this curfew order is set at three months or a fine not exceeding rupees three hundred thousand or to both imprisonment and fine. The September 2023 ATA’s purported safeguard in Clause 81(2) of a curfew order being for the purpose of (a) controlling, detecting or investigating the occurrence of systematic and widespread committing of terrorism and other offences under this Act; (b) for the protection of national or public security from terrorism and other offences under this Act; or (c) to prevent the systematic and widespread committing of offences under this Act, has been omitted from the PSTA.

By Clause 66 of the proposed PSTA the Ministry of Defence Secretary is empowered to declare places as Prohibited Places. The September 2023 ATA made the declaration conditional on a recommendation made by the Inspector General of Police or the Commander, respectively of, Army, Navy or Air Force or the Director General of Coast Guard (Clause 82(1). The declaration under the PSTA is to be for places reasonably suspected of being used to commit an offence under this Act (Clause 66(1)).

The declaration is to be by Order published in the Gazette, stipulating any place of public use or any other location to be a prohibited place. Prohibitions include prohibitions on entry, prohibitions on taking photographs, video recording and making sketches. The prohibition is for a 72-hour period (Clause 66(5) of the PSTA). The previous September 2023 ATA fixed the duration of the order at 7 days. Under the PSTA, extension of the 72-hour declaration may be extended by order of a Magistrate.

A person who contravenes the order, or willfully takes photographs, video recordings and makes drawings or sketches of a prohibited place commits an offence and is liable to a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding rupees three million or to both. (Clause 66(7) and (8)) of the PSTA.)

5. The PSTA fails to introduce legal aid and compensation for arbitrary arrest, detentions and other harms that may be caused by orders/directions made in terms of this Act on the lives of innocent citizens

These are basic requirements in international standards for any criminal legislation relating to terrorism owing to the nature of such laws. The experience with the PTA demonstrates the devastating lifelong impacts that arrest, detention and torture under terror legislation have had on detainees and their families. The PSTA fails to recognize or provide redress for this.

This brief note is prepared urgently to assist those seeking to read and understand the scope and scheme of the bill gazetted and to foster constructive substantive discussion. Only some key themes to the proposed law have been highlighted. Please direct any concerns or comments to [email protected]. This document is dated December 17, 2025.