Legacy of Failed Terror Laws – Part 1

Photo courtesy of Brewminate

The Public Security Ordinance (PSO), enacted in 1947 and amended in 1988, granted sweeping executive powers to declare emergencies in the interest of public security. Championed by local elites including D.S. Senanayake, it was designed primarily to crush Marxist activism and the labour movement. Since independence in 1948, successive governments have wielded emergency regulations to suppress protests, strikes and insurgencies, deploying armed forces, conducting warrantless arrests and bypassing judicial oversight.

From 1948 to 1970, emergency regulations targeted peaceful protests in the North and East, emerging from post-colonial tensions and Sinhala majoritarianism. These powers allowed the executive to restrict fundamental rights of expression, assembly and association on vague grounds like national security, far exceeding international norms. The unjust use of such powers against Tamil political movements like the Federal Party suppressed legitimate demands rather than addressing genuine security threats.

Sri Lanka has been under near-continuous emergency rule for most of its post-independence history. The first emergency followed the Sinhala Only language policy and subsequent riots. A six year emergency followed the white terror of the regime and the April 1971 uprising of the JVP. During the armed conflict and the war between the state and the LTTE, the emergency rule was continuously maintained from 1983 to 2011 for 28 years.

More recently, emergencies were declared in 2018 during anti-Muslim violence in Kandy, in 2019 following the Easter bombings and repeatedly during the 2021-2022 economic crisis. In December 2025, the government invoked emergency regulations following Cyclone Ditwah. Thus, the emergency legislation evolved into a tool for managing dissent and enforcing Sinhala Buddhist hegemony rather than addressing genuine threats.

Dangerous models

Anti-terror legislation was initiated around 1970 and was enacted after the 1971 JVP uprising. The ruling coalition comprising the SLFP, the LSSP and the CP, for their inspiration, turned to apartheid laws in South Africa designed to crush the aspirations of the Black and Indian communities for equal rights and British emergency regulations against Irish militancy. These laws represent two of history’s most infamous counterinsurgency failures.

The Criminal Justice Commissions (CJC) Act was modelled directly on South Africa’s apartheid-era laws designed to maintain racial segregation and discrimination against the Black majority. In a similar vein, the CJC Act, PTA and proposed PSTA Bill have been designed to maintain class, race, language and religion-based discrimination. This was despite decades of pledges to end such practices.

History delivered its verdict in South Africa and apartheid laws failed. The system with its laws collapsed under internal resistance, international sanctions and unsustainable costs. Despite severe brutal armed repression, the African National Congress prevailed, bringing Nelson Mandela to power in 1994.

The British failure in Ireland

British emergency regulations implemented in Ireland tell an equally instructive story. These measures consistently failed to suppress militancy and often proved counterproductive. It intensified nationalist sentiment and fuelled violence from the war of independence through the troubles.^[i]

Harsh measures such as the indiscriminate and brutal use of Black and Tans^[ii], internment without trial, alienated the Irish Catholic community and bolstered support for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) rather than weakening it. Britain relied on security measures without a political strategy, offering no clear path to settlement. The Government of Ireland Act 1920 provided only limited Home Rule and formalised partition. It inflamed tensions rather than resolving.

The Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (1920) replaced civil courts with military tribunals and allowed internment. It failed spectacularly. Courts became overwhelmed, witnesses refused to testify and a 1921 ruling found it did not actually grant power to impose death penalties. When martial law was declared in December 1920, IRA attacks increased through the first half of 1921.

Frustrated by guerrilla warfare, British forces engaged in reprisals, burning homes and businesses. This is reminiscent of Sri Lanka’s 1983 Black July pogrom. These actions became IRA propaganda victories, damaged Britain’s reputation as a democracy and alienated moderate opinion. Emergency regulations could not stop mass non-cooperation like the 1920 Munitions Strike^[iii].

Britain eventually recognised that while military victory might be possible, the political and reputational costs were too high. This recognition led to the 1921 Truce and Anglo-Irish Treaty^[iv]. Only through comprehensive political negotiation was peace achieved, as demonstrated in the Northern Ireland peace process. In 2025, the UK government announced plans to repeal the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023, deemed flawed and failed legislation and ruled unlawful by courts.

Sri Lanka’s failed experiments

Sri Lanka received significant military advice and assistance including intelligence for counterterrorism from countries like China, India, Pakistan, Russia and Israel. The US, UK and Australia also contributed training and support, particularly in intelligence and counterinsurgency. After Western criticism of human rights during the war, Sri Lanka drifted away over time from Western-leaning positions to closer ties with China and Russia.

The Criminal Justice Commissions Act (1972) was established following the 1971 uprising and created special tribunals that undermined fundamental justice principles. The Act reversed the burden of proof, requiring defendants to prove their innocence rather than the prosecution proving guilt. It permitted the admission of evidence that would normally be inadmissible in court and removed the right to appeal.

The tribunal’s political and class bias was evident when it sentenced Rohana Wijeweera to life imprisonment, a penalty that exceeded even the Act’s own provisions. Although the Act was repealed in 1977 with all convictions made under it reversed, its legacy persists in the erosion of justice principles that became ingrained in the anti-terror laws enacted or proposed in its aftermath.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), temporarily enacted in 1979 and confirmed in 1982, initially appeared to target Tamil separatism and the LTTE. Despite brutal implementation through repression, torture and violence, the LTTE continued to grow stronger. The LTTE was ultimately defeated militarily in May 2009, not through the effectiveness of the PTA but due to changed international circumstances after 9/11 terror attacks in New York and military support from the US, India, Israel and others. The September 11 attacks served as a global catalyst for the rapid expansion of international and domestic anti-terror laws, spearheaded by the UN. The PTA’s failure to prevent LTTE activities from 1979 to 2009 speaks volumes about its actual effectiveness.

The clear lesson

The pattern of enactment, implementation and failure of such laws across South Africa, Ireland and Sri Lanka is unmistakable. The lesson that can be extracted from that pattern is that anti-terror and security laws based on discrimination and repression do not work. Such laws do not prevent terrorism or militancy because they alienate populations, create martyrs, fuel resistance and ultimately collapse under their own contradictions.

From studying the same pattern, one can determine what works: political solutions, dialogue, genuine reform and respect for human rights. These aren’t naive ideals. They are practical lessons written in blood and tears through countless failed experiments under authoritarian rule.

Sri Lanka finds itself at a juncture. We can continue down the path of failed colonial models or we can learn from history and choose a different way, a way built on genuine democracy, equality and rule of law.

The choice is obvious. The question is whether we have the resolve to pursue this course of action, notwithstanding fierce national and international pressure, particularly intelligence interest groups and lobbies, to conform to the established conservative counter-terrorism doctrine.

[i] The Irish War of Independence (1919-1921) established an independent Irish Free State but partitioned the island, creating Northern Ireland under UK rule. It sparked deep resentment and sectarian divides that festered for decades, ultimately erupting into The Troubles (late 1960s-1998). The Troubles were a violent ethno-nationalist conflict in Northern Ireland between Irish Republicans (seeking a united Ireland) and Ulster Loyalists (wanting to remain British. This came to an end with the Good Friday Agreement but has left deep scars.

[ii] The Black and Tans were British ex-soldiers recruited into the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) during the Irish War of Independence (1919-1921) as temporary police reinforcements. They were nicknamed for their makeshift green tunics and khaki trousers resembling a foxhound pack. Known for brutality and indiscipline, they retaliated against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) with violent reprisals, including burning towns, leading to civilian deaths and widespread animosity, becoming a symbol of British oppression in Ireland.

[iii] The 1920 Munitions Strike (May 27 – December 21, 1920) was a major campaign of passive resistance by Irish railway and dock workers during the Irish War of Independence. Workers refused to handle or transport British military equipment, munitions, or armed troops, significantly disrupting British logistics across Ireland.

[iv] The Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed on December 6, 1921, ended the Irish War of Independence, establishing the Irish Free State as a self-governing dominion within the British Empire (like Canada). It granted autonomy but kept the British Crown as head of state and retained naval bases. This deeply divided Irish nationalists, leading to the Irish Civil War between pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty factions. Ultimately, the Pro-Treaty side prevailed and the Free State became a republic in 1949.