One year on the Government Must Act Decisively to Advance Peace and Justice
Photo courtesy of Human Rights Watch
One year after its meteoric rise to power, the NPP risks losing critical momentum and squandering an unparalleled opportunity of using its political capital to build a just peace in the war torn country.
Their historic victory on November 15, 2024 when they dissipated the old guard of parties that had monopolised politics since independence reflected the public’s demand for systemic change following the 2022 economic collapse and the aragalaya.
Their vote share rose by some 20% in two months, from presidential elections to parliamentary ones largely on the back of minority Tamil and Muslim voters who abandoned powerful ethnic parties to support them. Although the NPP promised little to them in their manifesto and despite their rootedness in Sinhala ethno-nationalism, minorities hoped that their firm stance on non-discrimination and equality coupled with prospects of transformation, could see a breakthrough on justice and peace.
No other governing party has been better suited for this challenge. Firstly, underscored by a mandate for reform they have the required number of seats to change the constitution. Secondly, the JVP, the NPP’s main constituent party, suffered large scale human rights violations, including torture and enforced disappearances in the hands of the state, when they led two insurrections in the 1980s and 1990s. They, above all, should understand the pain of justice denied.
However, one year on while the party has taken some important steps towards changing systems, particularly in relation to corruption, there is no sign of their transformative ambition extending to dealing with the causes of the conflict or redressing war related justice claims.
Unresolved issues
The NPP’s electoral success raised expectations among many war victims of finally getting accountability previously disregarded by governments. Since the war ended in 2009, successive governments have repeatedly denied mass atrocity claims despite well documented evidence that they were committed by both the military and the LTTE.
In 16 years of work with war survivors, the demand for justice shows no sign of diminishing, especially for families of disappeared. Their search for answers to what happened to their children and spouses, many who were surrendered to the military at the end of the war never to be seen again, has dented every aspect of their lives. Mothers who are now reconciling that their children have been killed are tormented with questions on how it happened, imagining their final moments. Others are still waiting, expecting their missing loved ones to return.
Decades of conflict produced victim groups from all ethnic communities. Northern Muslims, a less known group, marked 35 years of being forcibly evicted from their homeland by the LTTE. As they return to live with Tamils they seek acknowledgement, reparations and memorialisation like so many other victims.
The government has taken steps to release some civilian land occupied by the military but insufficient efforts have gone into halting the seizure lands of Tamils and Muslims in the north and east by various state institutions such as Archaeology, Forestry and, in some instances, Buddhasasana. Even 16 years after the war many survivors are unable to get back to their homes and progress with their lives
The NPP has also been extremely disappointing in dealing with the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) that has been used by successive governments to arbitrarily arrest and detain opponents, including journalists and civil society activists. It has also been used to curtail protests and securitise public spaces. In the north and east it was the foundational tool that enabled the security forces to act outside of the law, to arrest, detain, disappear people, take land and commit other human rights violations. The NPP has not yet repealed the PTA and proposed legislation to replace it is similarly repressive.
The governing party has also been silent on a political solution that deals with the core causes of the ethnic conflict. Previous governments have discussed various models of devolution of power and in 2017 the parliament, acting as a Constituent Assembly, made strong headway on a draft of a new constitution. Although far from ideal, this version addressed some key concerns for minorities and decentralised power from the centre.
Building on existing templates
A process of justice and constitutional reform is imperative and the government need not start anew. In 2015, Sri Lanka introduced a transitional justice programme that promised a truth and reconciliation commission, a justice mechanism to try individuals responsible for very serious human rights violations and offices to investigate missing persons and offer reparations. Although comprehensive on paper the coalition government lacked the political will to implement the process fully and in less than a year it became highly politicised and ethnicised. Tamil nationalists argued that the government was co-opting the process to whitewash the crimes of the military and Sinhala Buddhist nationalist casts inaccurate fears that their military war heroes will be unfairly imprisoned. The then government avoided confronting the claims and unwarranted fears and eventually the process collapsed.
In my previous work, I have argued that although textbook-like the process was still foundationally flawed as it imposed a global model without sufficiently adopting it to the Sri Lankan context. The important national consultations took place after the basic framework was agreed on and left little room for victims to craft the process. Victims were then extensively trained to understand what was on offer so they could engage with the top-down process. There was minimal initiative to think creatively recognising Sri Lanka’s unique context and accordingly adapt a process, including in responding to the ethnic and religious dimension of the conflict and justice claims. I have already argued through empirical work that identity is a core factor to both the nature of crimes and what victims seek in terms of justice. For example, Tamils who were caught up in the last stages of the war argue that such serious atrocities would not have occurred if there were Sinhalese in the midst of them. Ethnic identity was a strong reason for them to be targeted for such attack and for the inaction on the part of the majority of the population. Similarly, Muslims were forcibly evicted from the north in 1990 specifically because they were not Tamil. The 2015 transitional justice process was unequipped to deal with such complex identity related issues leaving many victims disenchanted.
Nevertheless, irrespective of these challenges and limitations both the transitional justice and constitutional reform processes offer a strong foundation that the NPP can build. Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya recently told parliament that the government will initiate a domestic accountability process. If they do so, the following ten points must be critical considerations:
First, the NPP needs to outline their vision of how they see a future united Sri Lanka where all communities reconcile their past and can build a sustainable just peace. A policy of stamping out racism and treating all people equally is a good start but this will only be a sticking plaster over a festering wound. The senior leadership of the government is fully aware of how deep this wound is. They need to be confident and bold and lead at the highest level in outlining a new reconciliation and peacebuilding plan for the country. This needs leadership and with their longer parliamentary careers, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya should be at the forefront of such efforts. The prime minister herself was a member of the national consultations on constitutional reform as is well aware of what changes the public as a whole want. In many countries from South Africa, Sierra Leone, Liberia, East Timor to Guatemala, visionary leaders have driven such processes and brought about meaningful change.
Second, President Dissanayake must end years of denial and accept to the people the commission of state crimes. This is now top of the list of victim’s demand. The president has to take a leading role in shifting the mainstream narrative which sees the military purely as “heroes” who in a “humanitarian mission” rescued the Tamil people and saved the entire country by defeating terrorism. Even if the details may be contested, documented evidence of the incidents in the last stages of the war repudiates this narrative and the government must end years of coverups and be honest and open with the people.
Crimes committed by the LTTE has formed the basis of triumphalist majoritarian post-war nation building, conversely there has been no acceptance of the role of the state. Acceptance and acknowledgement cannot be devoid of criminal accountability. Having first-hand experience of state terror, the NPP needs to boldly challenge the military’s impunity and deal with broader opposition by targeting individuals in the chain of command.
In doing so the party will also need to confront its own past. Like the LTTE, the JVP has already had senior leadership killed, disappeared or jailed. Those who escaped cannot be exempt and must face justice – a small price to pay for the legacy of pursuing a just peace.
Third, the government needs to build victim trust by responding swiftly to the daily challenges of war-survivors from income generation and access to land to effective medical support.
Fourth, ever so often to appease the international community a government dangles the idea of forming a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Such a commission is essential in a country like ours where the truth is contested, however, we have also had very many commissions that have investigated human rights violations, which have not led to justice and redress. Victims have over and over again told commissions, consultations, practitioners and researchers like me what took place during the war. This body of existing testimonies should be the basis of any mechanism for redress, it already contributes to establishing facts or forensic truth, which is one of the four typologies of truth that truth commissions seek to produce. If Sri Lanka does go ahead with a TRC it can help to contribute towards the three other types of truth scholars identify: narrative, personal, emotional accounts; dialogical truth developed through collective discussions and reconciliatory truth, acknowledging and working through contesting truths. It is essential that victims must not be retraumatised as part of such a process.
Five, existing institutions such as the Office on Missing Persons and Office of Reparations need to be strengthened and supported to meet their objectives including through ensuring their independence and resourcing them with experienced and capable staff.
Six, victims, especially women who constitute the larger number of war survivors, must be empowered to lead the process. Through the years civil society and victim groups have strengthened immensely in clarifying and advocating for their justice needs, yet they continue to be side-lined in national processes. The NPP has successfully built a bottom up political movement of women political leaders and needs to offer the same support structures to minority women and victim groups to enable them to shape a justice process.
Seven, any transitional justice process needs to factor in identity-related claims and dynamics. Identity is integrally linked to crimes, and the ethno-religious character of the state significantly impedes the realisation of justice for minority groups. The country requires a process that recognises these linkages and is strengthened with multi-religious understandings of justice, including that which makes sense to its nearly 90 percent Buddhists and Hindus who believe accountability is spread through multiple lifecycles.
Eight, constitutional reform that addresses the cause of the conflict by allowing for a system of self-governance for minorities cannot be separated from a post-war justice process. Empirical research demonstrates that for minorities the demand for a political solution has not waned and autonomy to govern their homelands without interference from the state remains important. Having previously opposed devolution of power, the NPP needs to convince cadres to realise its importance not only for minorities but advancing economic development and community empowerment in Sinhala majority areas too.
Nine, the NPP’s early reputation of stamping out racism has to expand to equality and substantive non-discrimination. Tamils and Muslims within their party speak highly of equal treatment but notably this is within the confines of operating almost entirely in the Sinhalese language. The party as a whole has done little to open up to Tamil speakers and continues to differentiate between the justice needs of the majority and minority. In his speech at the JVP commemoration of heroes ceremony when President Dissanayake referred to his government as distinct from any other because of its “robust, institutionalised connection to the people”, which people is he referring to? Are all of his grand visions for change only speaking of and to the majority Sinhala people? If not, where are the references to others, Tamils, Muslims and Christians? Where is the recognition of the issues and challenges they have faced? Address this historic disparity in treatment, in inclusion, in non-discrimination must underline any NPP reform process.
Finally, decades of denying victims justice despite numerous guarantees and processes is the reason why international action became necessary. Since 2012, the United Nations Human Rights Council has been scrutinising, supporting and shaping transitional justice in Sri Lanka. This international involvement is unavoidable because violations of international law took place for which accountability is needed in line with international legal standards. Thereby, if the NPP wants to pursue a national transitional justice and constitutional reform process it will have to meet international legal and normative standards. This will include prosecutions for violations of international law.
This is partly where the NPP has a golden opportunity to not only change the course of history in Sri Lanka but also contribute towards global policy and process. Transitional justice has been facing heavy criticism because it superimposes internationally designed frameworks that prioritise maintaining international standards over responding to the specificity of local context and victim needs. There are very few examples of committed governments that have successfully developed processes that have bridged this gap.
If the NPP can establishing such a comprehensive process that meets international legal and normative standards it will enjoy global backing and be able to showcase a successful domestic transitional model to the world. But time is running out; radical projects such as this need to take place while public trust and confidence is high. They need to act now before the window for transformative change is lost.
