Sri Lanka’s New President Meets India’s Foreign Minister in Colombo
Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar’s visit to Colombo on October 4 marked the first high-profile foreign engagement following the election of Sri Lanka’s new president, Anura Kumara Dissanayake. Jaishankar met with key leaders including Prime Minister Dr. Harini Amarasuriya, Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath, as well as former President Ranil Wickremesinghe and opposition leader Sajith Premadasa. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) stated that the visit underscored India’s proactive outreach under its “Neighborhood First” policy, with Jaishankar extending an invitation to Dissanayake for an official visit to India.
During discussions, Jaishankar highlighted India’s commitment to supporting Sri Lanka’s development, presenting Indian aid as an alternative to Chinese financing. Key initiatives discussed included a $61.5 million grant to modernize the Kankesanthurai Port, a proposal India had initially floated in April 2024, and to convert $20 million in Line of Credit projects into grants. Energy cooperation, renewable energy exports, digital public infrastructure, health, and dairy development were also part of the agenda. Jaishankar also recalled India’s backing of Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring and IMF engagements.
A notable issue raised by Jaishankar was the longstanding dispute over Indian fishermen poaching in Sri Lankan waters. While India frames this as a humanitarian and livelihood issue, Sri Lanka perceives it as a violation of its sovereignty. Jaishankar urged Sri Lanka to release detained Indian fishermen and their boats, and reconsider fines. He also pressed for the full implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, a recurring Indian demand aimed at ensuring devolution of power to Tamil-majority regions.
Jaishankar’s visit encapsulates India’s broader strategy in South Asia – one that blends development assistance, security cooperation, and political engagement to assert its regional preeminence. For Sri Lanka, managing relations with India while maintaining autonomy has been a delicate balancing act, and Dissanayake – like his predecessors – will have to carefully navigate between accommodating Indian demands and resisting overreach.
Sri Lanka’s political leaders have historically resisted India’s attempts to shape its internal affairs, often seeking external support to balance Indian influence. This approach is rooted in the structural imbalance of South Asia, where India, as the regional giant, has traditionally aimed to dominate its smaller neighbors. The analogy to the American Monroe Doctrine is frequently cited in explaining India’s foreign policy, which prioritizes regional hegemony and discourages external interference.
Post-independence Indian leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru, maintained that regional stability would be best achieved through India’s leadership, discouraging South Asian nations from seeking alliances with external powers. This policy has been reflected in India’s interventions in Sri Lanka, notably the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, which led to the controversial 13th Amendment. India’s unilateral actions in recent times – for example, the pressure exerted on Sri Lanka about visiting Chinese research vessels and on awarding renewable energy projects to a Chinese company, as well as pressure exerted on Nepal with regards to Chinese projects there, etc. – further exemplify its strategy to assert dominance and preclude external influence.
Of course, India’s neighbors have opposed New Delhi’s preferred hierarchical regional order, and they have tried to do this in two ways: seeking support from external actors and regionalizing the issues they have with India. For Sri Lanka, successive governments have explored diverse strategies to counter Indian dominance. In the early post-independence period, the United National Party (UNP) relied on the Commonwealth and a defense pact with Britain as a safeguard against any potential Indian interventions. UNP stalwart Sir John Kotelawala said, “The day Ceylon dispensed with Englishmen completely, the island would go under India.” Later, Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) governments used ties with the Non-Aligned Movement and the communist bloc to create distance from India. In the 1980s, J.R. Jayewardene’s UNP administration sought closer ties with the United States as a counterbalance to India, which was aligned with the Soviet Union.
More recently, Sri Lanka’s pivot toward China, initiated under President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and accelerated by Mahinda Rajapaksa, has further diversified the island’s foreign relations. China’s strategic investments in Sri Lanka, particularly in infrastructure, have provided an alternative to Indian aid and increased Colombo’s leverage in navigating its complex relations with New Delhi.
President Dissanayake’s approach to balancing relations with India and China will present several challenges as he navigates Sri Lanka’s non-aligned foreign policy. While he seeks Chinese investments in key sectors like infrastructure and manufacturing, India has long been wary of China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka, especially in strategic locations such as the Hambantota Port and Industrial Park. India sees these as potential points of Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean, despite their commercial purpose. Maintaining a balance between economic collaboration with China and addressing India’s security concerns will require careful diplomacy.
India views Sri Lanka as being within its sphere of influence, making it sensitive to foreign powers’ activities in the region, especially China’s. Approving a Chinese military vessel’s docking, despite similar visits by warships from other nations, could heighten India’s concerns about China’s military intentions. Dissanayake will need to consistently reassure India that Chinese activities in Sri Lanka do not pose a threat to Indian national security.
As Dissanayake begins his presidency, he inherits these historical challenges. While his administration will seek to maintain cooperative relations with India, there is also likely to be a push to diversify Sri Lanka’s foreign partnerships and reduce India’s outsized influence. The delicate balance between accommodating India’s strategic interests and safeguarding Sri Lanka’s autonomy will be a key challenge for the new government, as South Asia remains one of the least integrated regions in the world, largely due to the asymmetry in power dynamics with India.
The broader regional implications of Jaishankar’s visit reflect the ongoing tension between India’s desire for regional dominance and the aspirations of its smaller neighbors to assert their sovereignty. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, like that of other South Asian nations, will continue to be shaped by its efforts to navigate these structural realities while seeking external partnerships that mitigate India’s overwhelming presence in the region.
