The JVP and Ethnic Relations: Walking a Tightrope to 2024 (Part 2)
Photo courtesy of Daily Mirror
In Part 1, we explored the JVP’s evolving rhetoric and policies regarding ethnic relations, highlighting a shift from a more homogenous vision of Sri Lankan identity towards recognizing and accommodating diversity. However, this shift is not without its contradictions and limitations. This second part examines the persistent unclear positions surrounding their stance on devolution, the shadow cast by their history of armed struggle and the implications of their approach for the upcoming 2024 elections, particularly in the context of the transformative aragalaya protests.
The devolution dilemma: navigating a minefield
Devolution, the idea of giving more power to local regions, is a crucial issue for Tamil communities. The JVP’s stance on this issue shows how carefully they are trying to balance different interests. While advocating for greater regional autonomy, their commitment to meaningful power sharing remains ambiguous, particularly when it comes to embracing solutions that might alter the unitary structure.
Historically, the JVP vehemently opposed devolution, seeing it as a threat to Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity. Their staunch resistance to the 13th Amendment or any form of devolution of powers fueled deep distrust among Tamils. They believed that giving more power to Tamil regions would ultimately lead to Sri Lanka breaking apart. This fear was tied to their strong support for Sinhala nationalism. During the past decades, they actively fought against any proposals for devolution, seeing them as dangerous concessions that threatened Sri Lanka’s unity (Venugopal, 2010).
However in recent years the JVP has softened their stance, suggesting a willingness to engage with the issue of devolution. However, this engagement remains cautious and ambiguous. Their 2019 manifesto, while acknowledging the distinct needs of the Tamil community in the North and East, stopped short of explicitly endorsing federalism, a key demand of many Tamil political actors. Instead, they proposed practical measures such as appointing Tamil speaking officials in the North and East and establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address violence against Muslims, stopping short of committing to full implementation of the 13th Amendment (JVP, 2019). This framing is still evident in their 2021 booklet where, despite advocating for decentralization, they avoid explicitly endorsing federalism. This suggests that the JVP, despite their rhetorical shift towards inclusivity, remains wary of any arrangement that could be seen by their core constituency as challenging the concept of a unitary state.
This shows a pattern. While the JVP is willing to make some changes that address specific concerns, it avoids endorsing anything that might upset their Sinhala nationalist supporters such as sharing real power. This hesitation likely comes from trying to balance minorities’ needs with the concerns of their Sinhala nationalist base, who fear federalism might lead to separatism. Their performance in the 2015 and 2019 elections shows the difficulty of handling this sensitive issue. Despite their attempts to present a viable leftist alternative, they struggled to break through the deeply divided political scene.
Their current approach favors gradual reform over radical change. In their official newspaper, Red Power, the JVP acknowledges the historical injustices faced by certain communities and advocates for a genuine political solution that ensures equal rights and opportunities for all. At the same time, the JVP continues to walk a tightrope on devolution. While acknowledging the historical injustices faced by certain communities and advocating for a genuine political solution that ensures equal rights and opportunities for all, the party’s continued emphasis on national unity and criticism of “separatist tendencies” suggests a cautious approach towards federalism. By criticizing other political parties that “suppress real issues” by playing the “ethnic card”, they position themselves as a party above ethnic divisions[1]. Instead of endorsing full implementation of the 13th Amendment, they propose strengthening and reforming the existing Provincial Council system[2]. This position allows them to appear open to addressing Tamil concerns while avoiding measures that might be seen as a threat to a unitary Sri Lanka.
Their focus on national unity and cautious approach to anything seen as a threat to Sri Lanka’s unity reflects their reluctance to fully back Tamil demands for more autonomy. In their articles, they draw a clear line between Tamil leaders they label as “communalist” and those advocating for unity, pushing for the marginalization of the former. While this rhetoric may resonate with Sinhalese voters concerned about separatism, it risks further alienating Tamils and other groups.
Aragalaya: a catalyst for change?
The 2022 aragalaya protests, characterized by their unprecedented scale and the diversity of participants, were a major moment in recent history. The protests, fueled by economic hardship and a desire for systemic change, brought to the forefront demands for greater inclusivity, ethnic reconciliation and a more responsive government. Crucially, the aragalaya saw a symbolic shift towards a more inclusive national identity, exemplified by events like the Mullivaikkal Remembrance Day, commemorating Tamil civilians killed in 2009. This commemoration, previously suppressed by the state, saw unprecedented participation from Sinhalese and other communities, including Buddhist priests and other clergy. This event, along with the coming together of religious figures from all faiths to protect protesters from state violence, reflected a powerful counter hegemonic imagination of pluralism and coexistence (Ruwanpura and Saleem, 2024).
Furthermore, the aragalaya highlighted the need to address past injustices, with protesters demanding accountability for war crimes and human rights abuses committed during the civil war. The protests also pushed for constitutional reforms that address power sharing and ethnic representation, specifically targeting the need for greater Tamil self-determination and a reassessment of the 13th Amendment and its limitations. These events and demands presented a unique opportunity for political parties, including the JVP, to re-evaluate their positions and potentially embrace a bolder approach to ethnic relations. However, the JVP’s post-aragalaya pronouncements suggest a continuation of their cautious approach. While acknowledging the need for dialogue and constitutional reform, they have consistently avoided explicitly endorsing federalism or any arrangement that might be seen as fundamentally altering the unitary structure. Their statements instead emphasized protecting Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and ensuring that any constitutional changes would not threaten it, suggesting a continued prioritization of a unitary state over addressing Tamil demands for devolution (Tamil Guardian, 2024a; Economy Next, 2024).
This cautious approach was evident in their response to calls for accountability for past atrocities committed during the war. While the JVP leadership has publicly apologized for their role in the 1988-89 insurrection, their continued commemoration of the “November Heroes” who died in the struggle, framing it as a struggle against “imperialism and Indian expansionism”, suggests a reluctance to fully confront their past and its impact on Tamil communities. This approach aligns with the party’s broader framing of communalism as a tool used by elites to divide the working class and against the country’s interests. By insisting on shared economic grievances, the JVP attempts to create a common ground that transcends ethnic boundaries[3].
The JVP’s engagement with the aragalaya, therefore, raises questions about their ability to respond to the calls for genuine reconciliation and a more inclusive country. While their participation in the protests and their criticism of the ruling regime might resonate with some voters, their reluctance to address the core issues of devolution and accountability for past injustices could hinder their efforts to build trust with the Tamil community.
Internal tensions and the path forward
The JVP’s navigation of ethnic relations is further complicated by potential internal divisions within the party. While party leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake has recently hinted at a more conciliatory approach, publicly acknowledging the need for dialogue and constitutional reform, including suggesting a willingness to implement the 13th Amendment, other senior members have expressed more hard-line views, emphasizing national unity and security and even boasting about their role in defeating “separatist terrorism”. This dissonance, amplified in the wake of the Aragalaya’s calls for systemic change, raises questions about whether a genuine shift in their stance on ethnic issues is underway.
As the JVP prepares for the 2024 elections, their ability to balance these competing pressures and navigate the complexities of Sri Lanka’s ethnic relations will be crucial. Will they continue walking a tightrope, attempting to appease both Sinhala nationalist and minorities’ constituencies without fully committing to either? Or will they take a more decisive stance on devolution and actively engage with the concerns of the Tamil community, demonstrating a genuine commitment to building a truly inclusive and equitable Sri Lanka? The answer to this question might determine their success in the upcoming election and their long term legitimacy as a force for positive change in Sri Lankan politics.
[1] Red Power, Jun 2023
[2] From Red Power, Aug 2023
[3] As seen in Red Power, Jun and Sep 2023
