The New Age of Maritime Multilateralism in the Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean region is undergoing a profound geopolitical transformation. From a relatively peripheral theater, it has now transitioned into a site of intense strategic competition, expanding naval activity and rising non-traditional security challenges.
Over the past decade, the region has become a strategic priority for several external actors. The United States’ opening of embassies in the Maldives and Seychelles in 2023, Japan’s efforts to consolidate its role as a development partner, and Australia’s designation of the Indian Ocean as part of its “immediate region” in its 2024 National Defense Strategy are all reflections of this renewed priority. Other external actors in the quest to expand their influence in the region include Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
However, no actor matches China in the scale and pace of its expansion. Starting with its first anti-piracy deployment in 2008, it now has embassies in all Indian Ocean littoral states, participates in all regional organizations, has invested in around 17 ports across the rim and has established a permanent military base in Djibouti.
This structural change in the maritime security architecture has created both new opportunities and challenges for the South Asian littoral states. Confronted with intense competition from China, India – the region’s resident great power – is consolidating its role as a key security provider while gradually moving beyond the bilateralism and skepticism toward external actors that once defined its neighborhood policy.
For smaller states, the crowd of external powers has opened avenues to diversify partnerships, hedge between great powers, and retain their autonomy. This interplay of great power competition and small states’ quest for autonomy has produced a polycentric security order that is dynamic yet structurally fragmented. What characterizes this emerging order are weak institutional frameworks, overlapping multilaterals, and recurring tensions.
Toward a Polycentric Alignment Strategy
The challenge of managing vast exclusive economic zones, combined with economic pressures and climate stress, has deepened the vulnerabilities of small South Asian littorals. To retain strategic autonomy in an increasingly competitive Indian Ocean region, these states are diversifying their security partnerships through multiple, overlapping frameworks. This process of strategic diversification enables them to enhance their political leverage, extract economic benefits, and ensure autonomy.
Leveraging their geostrategic location, these small island nations now engage simultaneously with Western powers, China, and India. The evolving defense posture of the Maldives points to this diversification trend. The Maldives concluded a Defense and Security Framework Agreement with the United States in 2020 and another defense agreement with Japan in 2025. Furthermore, it agreed to deepen defense cooperation with China, including the receipt of non-lethal military equipment and training. It recently received a Guardian-class Patrol Boat from Australia, signifying the increasing ties between the two countries.
Sri Lanka is pursuing a similar strategy. It has expanded its defense cooperation with the United States through a Memorandum of Understanding that focuses on maritime domain awareness (MDA) and peacekeeping. It now receives maritime surveillance drones from Japan. The 2025 defense pact signed with India offers a more structured and institutionalized framework for collaboration. Discussions with Saudi Arabia signal Colombo’s intent to widen its partnership with Gulf countries, too. Sri Lanka maintains a strong maritime security cooperation with the U.K. through strategic dialogues and hydrographic cooperation.
Beyond bilateralism, both Sri Lanka and the Maldives are embedded in a dense network of regional groupings. They are a crucial part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Silk Route while simultaneously playing active roles in India-centric and other wider multilateral mechanisms, such as the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR). This diversified and multilayered security posture of the littoral states further reinforces the region’s emerging polycentric maritime order.
India’s Multilateralism and Quiet Leadership
India has, over the years, established itself as a key security provider in the Indian Ocean region. Its reputation rests on its consistent record of crisis response in the region, including the rapid multi-country deployment during the 2004 tsunami and Operation Sadbhav during Typhoon Yagi in 2024.
India’s strategic intent was further consolidated through its evolving doctrinal frameworks, such as the 2004 and 2015 maritime security doctrines and policy visions under the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and the more recent MAHASAGAR. Both initiatives emphasize capacity building, regional interoperability and cooperative partnerships with like-minded countries.
In line with these frameworks, India has steadily expanded its network of strategic partnerships and multilateral engagements. The Joint Strategic Vision with France in 2015, as well as trilateral dialogues (such as France-India-UAE and Australia-India-Japan) and white shipping agreements with at least 26 countries, reflect India’s interest in multilateral cooperation. India’s membership in the Quad, with its emphasis on a “free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific,” further indicates its openness to cooperating with like-minded partners.
India also focuses on establishing institutional mechanisms that can sustain long-term cooperation. In 2008, the Indian Navy conceived the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. It now hosts the IFC-IOR in Gurugram. India also plays a prominent role in IORA and has proposed an IORA Center of Excellence in Kochi. India played a crucial role in the establishment and revival of the CSC in 2020.
Equally significant is the calibrated change in India’s diplomatic posture toward smaller South Asian littorals. Recognizing that a heavy-handed approach would be counterproductive in the current strategic environment, New Delhi has adopted a more pragmatic approach. The change in its strategic discourse from “net security provider” to “Preferred Security Partner” reflects a deliberate attempt to create the image of a trusted, non-intrusive and cooperative partner.
New Delhi’s shift goes beyond rhetoric. In the recently concluded Colombo Security Conclave in New Delhi, India avoided pushing concerns about China’s footprint onto the agenda, acknowledging that CSC members maintain substantive ties with Beijing and would resist any overtly anti-China framing. Thus, a functional and issue-based security approach by the region’s resident great power is opening pathways for institutionalized cooperation in an otherwise fragmented security atmosphere.
The Way Forward
The Indian Ocean region is not dominated by a single power but by a multitude of actors of varying capabilities and interests, thereby making the emerging order not only polycentric but also highly fragile. The absence of hegemonic domination does not guarantee stability. Given the growing influence of the small states in shaping this evolving order, their inclination to play rival great powers against one another may intensify geopolitical rivalries and further strain an already fragile security architecture. Further, persistent political volatility and recurring bilateral tensions, as seen in the temporary stalling of the CSC, lead to institutional paralysis and strategic uncertainty.
Tackling the new-age challenges of the region requires greater cooperation among the resident countries. The South Asian littorals need to establish clearer procedural continuity and devise mechanisms to insulate regional organizations from political swings. Prioritizing issue-based functional multilateralism can help build trust and manage rivalry. Expanding cooperation in MDA, capacity-building, and climate security provides less politically volatile sectors for sustained engagement. Platforms like the IORA, IONS, and ICS should be developed into robust and resilient institutions capable of absorbing political shocks and sustaining regional cooperation. Combined, these measures may help in reducing the uncertainties of a fragmented architecture and create a more stable, cooperative, and resilient security architecture in the Indian Ocean Region.
