Unprecedented Crossovers in Sri Lanka’s Presidential Race

Sri Lanka’s political landscape has always been a turbulent one, characterized by shifting allegiances and strategic maneuvering, especially as national elections approach.

As the much-anticipated presidential election on September 21 nears, the country is witnessing an unprecedented wave of political crossovers, reshaping the dynamics among the main candidates.

The scale of these defections, particularly from the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), has sparked intense debate about their potential impact on the election’s outcome. With the public’s growing disillusionment with traditional political figures, the upcoming election is set to be a critical moment in Sri Lanka’s political history, raising questions about whether these defections will truly influence the vote or merely underscore the electorate’s frustration with the status quo.

There are 38 candidates in the fray. Four of them, including Anura Kumara Dissanayake representing the National People’s Power (NPP), President Ranil Wickremesinghe contesting as an independent candidate, opposition leader Sajith Premadasa of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), and Namal Rajapaksa of the SLPP, are the main contenders.

Over the last two years, the SLPP has been hemorrhaging MPs. Of the 145 SLPP leaders who won seats in parliament in the 2020 general election, almost 130 crossed over to support President Wickremesinghe, SJB leader Premadasa and the Mawbima Janatha Party (MJP) of businessman Dilith Jayaweera. Most of them — close to 100 MPs joined Wickremesinghe after the election was officially announced in late July 2024. The SJB and the NPP have not been affected by large-scale crossovers.

The million-dollar question is whether the 100 SLPP MPs who joined Wickremesinghe have brought with them significant votes.

In the 2020 election, the SLPP obtained over 6.85 million votes but the popularity of the party has plummeted since. Most Sri Lankans blame the Rajapaksas, the family that controls the SLPP, for the current economic crisis. The consensus in Sri Lankan political circles is that the overwhelming majority of those who voted for the SLPP have moved to the NPP, Wickremesinghe and SJB. The people who would vote for the SLPP now probably are hardcore Rajapaksa loyalists.

The impact of MPs who decided to change their party affiliation is a widely studied topic. There have been many instances around the world where political parties have been destabilized by crossovers.

Closer to home, in 2001, defections caused the collapse of the People’s Alliance government led by then-President Chandrika Bandaranaike, a little over a year after her alliance won a closely fought parliamentary election. Her rival, United National Party’s (UNP) Ranil Wickremesinghe won the 2001 election.

A few years later, the UNP suffered a serious setback when 17 of its MPs joined Mahinda Rajapaksa. These defections hurt the party’s reputation. Looking superficially at these two examples from recent Sri Lankan political history, one can conclude that the defections adversely affected the SLPP, and that the massive defections from the SLPP in recent years, might boost Wickremesinghe’s electoral performance.

However, there are significant differences between the abovementioned occasions and the current moment.

First of all, these defections would have only a marginal impact on the SLPP, which is a party by the Rajapaksas for the Rajapaksas. Of course, the defection of close to 100 MPs would have an impact on the morale of the SLPP, and of the SLPP organizational structures that have been weakened by the defections.  However, even if the 100 MPs remained with the party, the SLPP would have come in fourth.

Poll surveys dating from 2023, as well as those involved in measuring public sentiment have placed the SLPP as the least favorite mainstream political party. Most Sri Lankans see the Rajapaksas as corrupt and directly responsible for the 2022 economic crisis. The overwhelming majority of the SLPP vote has split between the NPP and the SJB, with most SLPP voters shifting support to the former.

Even before the defection of the MPs, SLPP was polling at about 8 percent. Those who remain with the SLPP are die-hard Rajapaksa loyalists, who would vote for anyone from the Rajapaksa family. It is unlikely that the defecting MPs would be taking a chunk of the remaining SLPP votes with them. Their support won’t bring in millions of votes to Wickremesinghe.

The other difference is that in 2001 and 2007, the defecting MPs joined a party that was bound to win. In July 2001, the LTTE attacked the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA). Most Sri Lankans blamed Chandrika Bandaranaike government for the lapse in security. Following the attack, Sri Lanka’s GDP growth was at a negative 1.4 percent, the first time the country saw negative growth since independence.

In the circumstances, the UNP was seen as the obvious replacement. In 2007, the UNP dissidents joined Mahinda Rajapaksa, who was at the height of his power. The Sri Lankan Army was steadily defeating the LTTE and the overwhelming majority of Sri Lankans were behind the war effort. The UNP was losing ground politically and it was universally acknowledged that the party would be decimated in the coming elections. These predictions proved correct. Unlike in 2001 and 2007, when defecting MPs joined a party poised to win, the current defectors are rallying behind a candidate who is not seen as the obvious next choice.

The upcoming presidential election in Sri Lanka will serve as a litmus test for the country’s political landscape, marked by unprecedented crossovers and shifting allegiances. While these defections have undoubtedly affected the SLPP and boosted Wickremesinghe’s camp, they may not translate into significant electoral gains. The erosion of public trust in the SLPP, primarily due to the Rajapaksas’ perceived role in the economic crisis, suggests that the party’s core support base has dwindled to a small, yet loyal, faction.

The larger question remains whether the defectors can sway enough votes to make a meaningful difference in the election. Wickremesinghe’s lack of popularity, as evidenced by the low turnout at rallies organized by these defectors, indicates that many voters may be skeptical of politicians who switch sides for personal gain. This skepticism is further amplified by the widespread criticism on social media, where the electorate voices its frustration with political horse-trading.

As the election approaches, the true impact of these defections will be revealed. Will they bolster Wickremesinghe’s campaign, or will they simply highlight the public’s disillusionment with the existing political order? In any case, the upcoming election promises to be a pivotal moment in Sri Lanka’s political journey, with the potential to reshape the country’s future in profound ways.