Al Qaeda is known for its sophisticated and comprehensive intelligence techniques, raising concerns among major state intelligence officials who believe that the group employs similar Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) as nation-states. Al Qaeda’s training manuals provide extensive guidance on gathering open-source intelligence, conducting surveillance, interrogating prisoners, and recruiting assets within foreign governments. Contrary to the belief that they operate solely on religious fervor and barbarism, Al Qaeda exhibits adeptness in intelligence collection and counterintelligence methods. What is less widely known is that Al Qaeda has assimilated many of its intelligence TTPs from major states due to long-standing and complex relationships. Notably, the United States, Russia, Iran, and Britain have inadvertently contributed to this situation. Major powers have shared TTPs with their allies and proxies, inadvertently allowing non-state actors like Al Qaeda to adopt and incorporate them into their operations.

The Iran/Hezbollah relationship and Al Qaeda’s connection

Iran’s intelligence capabilities were initially limited in the 20th century, but with the formation of the Iranian State Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) in 1957, the CIA played a role in providing intelligence and counterintelligence training to SAVAK personnel as a guard against Soviet expansion. British intelligence (MI6) also maintained a HUMINT network within SAVAK, leading to the dissemination of British TTPs. After the Iranian revolution in 1979, SAVAK was replaced by SAVMA, and many CIA/MI6 trained personnel remained within the Iranian intelligence apparatus. Iran then started supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982, providing operational and intelligence support against Israel. Al Qaeda observed Hezbollah’s capabilities and sought to enhance its own. In exchange for money and fighters, Hezbollah agreed to train Al Qaeda operatives in explosives and evasion techniques. During this time, Al Qaeda indirectly acquired Iranian TTPs. Subsequently, Iran established a direct relationship with Al Qaeda in the early 1990s when Osama bin Laden resided in Sudan. Iran agreed to offer explosives, intelligence, and security training to Al Qaeda through proxies. Although Iran has publicly distanced itself from Al Qaeda post-9/11, it remained a hub for Al Qaeda fighters and leadership to travel to Afghanistan. Leaked documents also suggest Iran’s involvement in providing new suicide vests with advanced features to Al Qaeda in Iraq.

The Pakistan/ISI relationship and Al Qaeda’s training

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate was created by the British in 1948 after India’s decolonization, and British intelligence TTPs were naturally inherited by its personnel. ISI’s significance grew during the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, where it received support from the CIA in assisting the Mujahideen. The relationship allowed ISI operatives to receive intelligence training in the US. ISI’s connection with Osama bin Laden developed in the 1990s, and it actively participated in leading training camps for Al Qaeda, passing on its TTPs inadvertently. Al Qaeda’s intelligence training, which likely included methods from ISI and Hezbollah, aided the group’s survival and ability to target major powers.

The role of Western powers in Al Qaeda’s intelligence development

Surprisingly, Western powers contribute to Al Qaeda’s intelligence collection and TTP development by continually publishing military and intelligence doctrines. Al Qaeda, among other non-state actors, benefits from this as they can easily access the latest operating procedures of the US and UK military through internet searches. This knowledge allows Al Qaeda to implement more robust counterintelligence methods, as they have a better understanding of their adversaries. In summary, Al Qaeda’s intelligence capabilities stem from a combination of learned TTPs from major states and their continued access to Western intelligence materials. These factors have allowed the group to adapt and evolve its intelligence methods, enabling its continued operations and survival despite counterterrorism efforts by major powers.