In Chinese Discussions of Pakistan, Balochistan – Not Kashmir – Dominates
Much has been written about how the current round of India-Pakistan crisis might have brought the Kashmir issue back into the global limelight. In Chinese strategic circles, however, it is not Kashmir, but Balochistan that seems to be dominating the discourse. The sentiment in Beijing is that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is facing an unprecedented two-front challenge as tensions between India and Pakistan soar on one hand and Balochistan bleeds on the other.
For example, on March 11, 2025, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) – a militant group that aspires to an independent Balochistan – hijacked the Jafar Express train, which connects Quetta and Peshawar. The BLA blew up part of the track and took the passengers hostage. The demonstration of the BLA’s growing strength– and, in particular, their ability to paralyze important transportation routs – cast a long shadow on China’s CPEC dreams.
Amid rising tension between India and Pakistan over the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, the BLA struck again. On May 2, the Baloch rebel group seized Mangochar city in the Kalat district of Balochistan. The BLA captured government agencies, confiscated vehicles and weapons, and caused casualties on the Pakistani side. Notably, the attack also cut off the expressway from Quetta to Karachi and the N-25 Highway. These roads are the lifelines for CPEC and account for 60 percent of the trade flow in southern Pakistan. As a result of the blockade, various reports in the Chinese internet claimed, Gwadar Port was almost paralyzed, with 13 trucks loaded with materials for CPEC burned, 40 percent of the containers piled up and cargo ships unable to enter nor leave the port. Such a “paramilitary” operation, one Chinese analyst noted, goes far beyond the scope of ordinary terrorist attacks and is more like an organized and premeditated “regime change experiment.”
On May 15, shortly after a ceasefire was reached between India and Pakistan, there was news about leaders and activists of the Balochistan movement declaring independence from Pakistan. Although it got little coverage from international media, it triggered heated debates in China about the fate of CPEC. On May 21 there was a suicide bombing in Khuzdar, yet another important node of CPEC.
Given the trajectory of developments, Chinese observers warned that if the momentum of Baloch resistance is not curbed now, the situation in Balochistan will further deteriorate and may even lead to larger scale conflicts, not only endangering the Pakistani state’s survival, but also severely damaging China’s overseas interests and national security.
Meanwhile, there is already growing domestic resentment in China over the rising security cost of CPEC. As per some Chinese estimates, more than 60 percent of the attacks in Balochistan are aimed against Chinese projects and the cost of first phase of the corridor construction has increased by no less than 23 percent due to these attacks. Chinese companies are now forced to invest huge amounts in hiring security personnel, purchasing security equipment, and building protection facilities in order to ensure the safety of project personnel and facilities. It is generally understood that to build a substation in the region, the security force needed is twice the number of project staff; this has a direct bearing on the economic viability and sustainability of CPEC. This has led to huge challenges in attracting investment for CPEC projects, both domestic and international, further affecting the overall speed and scale of the corridor construction.
To shift blame, China often builds upon Pakistani discourse and accuses the United States, India, as well as other external powers of secretly supporting Balochistan militants in an attempt to strangle the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The Balochistan issue, after all, is not Pakistan’s “internal issue” but the “eye of the geopolitical storm” of CPEC, argued an article in South Asian Newsletter, supposedly close to the Chinese government.
However, deep down, there is a quiet acknowledgement of the “resource curse” that Balochistan has been facing since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. “How are the Baloch people doing under Pakistani rule? In one word: miserable,” read one private media commentary with a substantial following, highlighting that “Balochistan’s GDP accounts for only 3.5 percent of the country’s total, its per capita income is less than $700, and even its primary school enrolment rate is less than 40 percent.” In terms of education, medical care, and infrastructure Balochistan province ranks the lowest in Pakistan, despite being both a critical artery – constituting 70 percent of Pakistan’s coastline – and the prized “money bag” for Pakistan, with more than mineral reserves valued at $2.5 trillion. Other articles on the Chinese internet too highlighted various draconian policies of the Pakistan government, along with decreases in Balochistan’s resource revenue, as important reasons behind the current insurgency in the province.
Even as the role of external powers behind the Baloch movement remains inconclusive, China is most concerned about how the worsening security situation in Balochistan may open up new opportunities for rival powers, including India. For instance, Beijing was quite alarmed by Tehran and Kabul’s diplomatic overtures toward New Delhi during the peak of India-Pakistan tension. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited India and signed multiple cooperation agreements. Meanwhile, the Taliban leadership publicly denied Pakistani allegations of Indian missiles violating Afghan airspace and Taliban Foreign Minister Muttaqi called Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar for the first time in mid-May. Several articles in the Chinese internet strongly criticized the two countries for “turning against the trend” and “back-stabbing China” by “putting a pincer attack on the China-Pakistan strategic alliance – the cornerstone of China’s South Asia strategy for the past several decades.” Chinese analysts argued that Tehran’s economic difficulties and geopolitical calculations and the Afghan Taliban’s desire for regime survival and recognition might have been the key reasons behind their stance on the crisis.
The inference drawn in Beijing is that “Pakistan is surrounded from all sides and under great pressure… which in turn is putting China’s strategic interests in the region under fire.” No wonder, then, that from April 26 to May 19, China and Pakistan carried out five rounds of telephonic conversations and two face-to-face meetings. Not just that, but within 48 hours of the call between India and Afghan officials, Yue Xiaoyong, China’s special envoy for Afghan affairs, and Mohammed Sadiq, the Pakistani prime minister’s special representative for Afghanistan, met Afghan officials. Within the next nine days, China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan held two high-level trilateral meetings in Beijing. The last-minute damage-control by China has delivered some positive results for now, with Iran showing goodwill to Pakistan and Afghanistan and Pakistan committing to upgrade diplomatic ties with each other, but China remains unconvinced.
A case is being made for China to become more involved in the region, on grounds that “this is not a diplomatic crisis far away, but a knife pointed directly at China’s neck.” When and how should China intervene is something that is being widely debated.
On Balochistan, one view is that China and Pakistan should intensify security cooperation, and China should further arm the Pakistani state, providing superior intelligence and cutting edge equipment to “neutralize” the Balochistan challenge. Others, however, caution that China’s active role in the military suppression of Baloch rebels may prove counterproductive; these voices urge China to “use RMB to defeat bullets.” China faces a dilemma on the Baloch issue — if it supports the Pakistani government’s strong military suppression of the Baloch people, it will stoke strong local anti-China sentiment; on the other hand, if China tries to reach out to the rebels directly, it risks undermining Islamabad’s authority on the Balochistan issue.
On Iran and Afghanistan, China’s strategy is to dangle the carrot of Belt and Road benefits, despite knowing that it is difficult for China to reverse its cautious stance in the short term, whether on the issue of investment amid U.S. sanctions, international recognition, or the Wakhan Corridor. China, therefore, is open to wielding the stick in terms of weaponizing Iran’s isolation or the Afghan Taliban’s poor record in women’s rights, inclusive government, and terrorism. If needed, Beijing can build pressure on these countries through third parties under existing platforms like China-Russia-Pakistan-Iran Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or China-Central Asia meeting, among others.
With regards to India, an angry Chinese commentariat clamored for China to build pressure on multiple fronts, from Kashmir to Punjab, from the Northeast to the southern state of Tamil Nadu, and across the South Asian neighborhood, particularly targeting Bangladesh, so as to prevent India from benefitting from Pakistan’s internal-external crisis. Some even encouraged Pakistan to use its advantage in the field of public opinion to rake up the Kashmir issue and pull all five United Nations Security Council permanent members for mediation – something, they argue, will never go in India’s favor due to conflicting great power interests, but could very well undermine the Quad cooperation. Both of those outcomes would suit Chinese interests very well. Meanwhile, sections within Chinese strategic community have also contemplated restarting counter-terrorism dialogues with India, so to hedge against the growing uncertainty in the region.
It is rather ironic that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a gift from China to its all-weather friend Pakistan, aimed at resetting the balance of power in South Asia, has unexpectedly ended up making Pakistan even more vulnerable. CPEC is exposing Pakistan’s soft-underbelly – the Balochistan issue – and giving China more of a headache than any strategic or economic dividend.
Going forward, more than Kashmir, it is Balochistan that is most likely to remain in the eye of the storm. It is there that the struggle for influence among major powers is going to play out — a trend that the world must closely monitor.
