Sri Lanka’s proposed Rs.4.261 billion purchase of four Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) raises a fundamental policy question: is the country investing in a strategically essential maritime surveillance capability, or committing scarce public resources to an expensive technology programme without sufficiently demonstrating its long-term financial and operational returns?
The Government’s justification rests on a substantial geographical challenge. Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends across approximately 517,000 square kilometres, 27 times the country’s landmass. Monitoring this vast maritime territory through conventional Air Force aircraft is expensive, resource-intensive and difficult to sustain continuously. The proposed Israeli-made UAV fleet could therefore provide a more efficient surveillance alternative.
Deputy Defence Minister Aruna Jayasekera has informed Parliament that four aircraft will be acquired through an emergency government-to-government procurement involving BlueBird Aero Systems, in which Israel Aerospace Industries holds an equity stake. The revised arrangement provides four aircraft instead of the two previously discussed, with operational training and three years of maintenance support.
There is little dispute that improved maritime monitoring is necessary. Illegal fishing, human trafficking, narcotics smuggling, suspicious vessel movements and threats to maritime resources require stronger surveillance capabilities. The drones could also assist in locating missing fishermen and responding to floods, cyclones and other disasters.
However, the expansion from two aircraft to four raises questions that Parliament should resolve before approving the agreement.
First, has the Defence Ministry completed an independent assessment demonstrating why four aircraft are necessary? The Government should disclose the expected surveillance coverage, operational deployment schedules, aircraft availability and estimated annual operating costs. Without such information, the additional expenditure cannot be adequately evaluated against measurable national security benefits.
Second, the emergency procurement route requires particular attention. Although a government-to-government arrangement may offer diplomatic and administrative advantages, it should not become a substitute for transparent technical evaluation, competitive price benchmarking and independent procurement scrutiny. Parliament should be informed whether alternative suppliers and comparable surveillance technologies were examined.
Third, the financing mechanism deserves serious examination. The Government claims that the Rs.4,261 million purchase will not require additional Treasury funds because money previously allocated for helicopter maintenance will be redirected under Financial Regulation 66.
However, transferring an existing allocation does not eliminate the economic cost. If helicopter maintenance is postponed or reduced, the Air Force could face operational weaknesses elsewhere. The Government must disclose which maintenance activities will be affected and whether existing helicopter readiness will be compromised.
More importantly, the three-year maintenance package does not establish the programme’s lifetime affordability. Replacement components, technical upgrades, software support, specialist training and possible foreign-exchange exposure could generate substantial future costs.
There are also questions concerning cybersecurity, sensitive maritime intelligence, data ownership and the extent of Sri Lanka’s technological independence. The Government must ensure that operational information remains under appropriate Sri Lankan control and that foreign technical dependencies do not compromise national security.
The proposed fleet could eventually become a foundation for a broader maritime surveillance network. However, expanding the programme into additional aircraft, coastal monitoring systems and integrated intelligence platforms should follow a transparent assessment of its initial performance.
Sri Lanka cannot afford another procurement commitment whose long-term costs become visible only after the initial contract expires.
The real test is not how advanced the imported technology appears, but whether it delivers demonstrable security benefits at an affordable cost. Parliament must demand the technical, financial and contractual evidence before approving the deal. National security is indispensable, but accountability over public expenditure must remain equally non-negotiable.
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