Modi’s holistic plan for breaking China’s Indo-Pacific hold
When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid his first state visit to Mauritius in March 2015, he launched India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region, or SAGAR, doctrine.
A decade later, in March 2025, during another visit to Mauritius, Modi announced the launch of the Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions, or MAHASAGAR, policy – an upgraded and more comprehensive version of SAGAR.
MAHASAGAR signals a multilayered, comprehensive, long-term and more ambitious Indian vision to the Indo-Pacific, one that extends beyond security concerns to include development, technology sharing and economic cooperation.
During Modi’s visit to Mauritius, India upgraded its bilateral relationship with Mauritius to an Enhanced Strategic Partnership.
Modi’s new vision of MAHASAGAR – which means “sea” in Hindi – seeks to integrate trade-driven development, capacity-building for sustainable growth and a mutual security framework to ensure a stable future.
Concessional financing, technological cooperation and institutional support are expected to play key roles in this initiative. How the MAHASAGAR policy, as with SAGAR 2.0, will be implemented, however, remains to be seen.
Over the past decade, SAGAR has served as India’s strategic framework for maritime engagement in the evolving Indo-Pacific dynamics, emphasizing India’s contribution to ensuring a safe, secure and stable regional order.
Modi’s keynote speech at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue further sharpened India’s Indo-Pacific approach, situating it in a broader geopolitical context. At the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue, Vikram Misri, then India’s Deputy National Security Advisor (now Foreign Secretary), delineated five core pillars of SAGAR, namely:
- Security cooperation;
- Capacity-building;
- Collective action;
- Sustainable development; and,
- Maritime connectivity
These principles have guided India’s engagement with regional partners. India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) was introduced as a complementary mechanism to SAGAR, providing an open and non-treaty-based platform for collaboration. The IPOI promotes cooperation in maritime ecology, resource management, disaster response and security coordination.
Key Indo-Pacific stakeholders, including the US, Japan, Australia, ASEAN, France and New Zealand, have aligned with India on IPOI, underscoring its inclusive and cooperative approach to Indo-Pacific governance.
India has strategically embedded itself within regional security and economic frameworks to operationalize SAGAR. Initiatives such as the BIMSTEC, Colombo Security Conclave (established in 2020 with Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives) and India’s observer status in the Indian Ocean Commission (comprising Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mayotte and Réunion) underscore its commitment to institutionalized maritime cooperation.
Beyond multilateral engagements, India has undertaken significant capacity-building measures to reinforce maritime security and regional stability. These include sharing white shipping information, improving maritime domain awareness and strengthening humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) frameworks.
Mauritius exemplifies India’s proactive role in capacity-building, benefiting from extensive Indian assistance in its Coast Guard modernization, infrastructural development and economic partnerships. India has undertaken various developmental projects in Mauritius, such as the metro project, the new Supreme Court building, the 956 housing project, a new ENT hospital and others
Despite India’s efforts, China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) necessitates a recalibrated approach. The geopolitical rivalry between India and China, exacerbated by the Galwan border clash in 2020, has reinforced strategic competition, particularly in the IOR.
China has systematically expanded its economic and military influence in the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, challenging India’s traditional regional role.
China’s economic leverage is a major concern for India as Mauritius’ bilateral trade with China (US$1.1 billion) is nearly double that with India ($554 million), reflecting Beijing’s stronger financial influence. India’s challenge lies in bridging this economic gap while maintaining its strategic partnerships.
The shift from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR seemingly aims to counter this challenge by scaling up developmental and security cooperation with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region.
Against the backdrop of the return of a transactional US foreign policy under the Trump administration, fast-evolving US-China rivalry, the often predatory nature of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – and its growing footprints in the IOR and the Pacific Island Region – all necessitate the move from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR.
The gaps between persistent non-traditional security threats and the preparedness of littoral states positions India as a credible and reliable net security provider to the IOR and wider Indo-Pacific region.
However, India faces critical financial hurdles to scaling up its ambitions. A review of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) annual report reveals a decline in the budget allocated to the ministry, undermining India’s ability to provide aid and sustain large-scale support for the Technical and Economic Cooperation (TEC) programs of the MEA.
The Fourth Report of the Committee on External Affairs (2024-25) of the 18th Lok Sabha of highlights the shortfall and recommends “a phased increase of at least 20% annually in the MEA budget over the next five years to address resource deficits and alignment with long-term goals.”
Without adequate financial commitment, MAHASAGAR risks becoming an ambitious diplomatic acronym without the funds to back its transformational aims. The transition from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR reflects India’s recognition of the need for a broader, more dynamic engagement strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
For this vision to materialize into action, India must address several key challenges, including but not confined to scaling up financial commitments, strengthening partnerships with ASEAN, the Quad members (US, Japan, Australia) and key IOR nations.
To establish the policy’s credibility, it must shore up economic engagement by diversifying trade and investment partnerships to counterbalance China’s economic dominance in the region. India’s proactive role in regional groupings like the IPOI and the Colombo Security Conclave should be further institutionalized to ensure long-term stability.
Ultimately, India’s success in realizing the MAHASAGAR’s goals will depend on its ability to match strategic ambition with financial and diplomatic execution. If effectively implemented, MAHASAGAR could reinforce India’s position as a preeminent power and net security provider in the Indo-Pacific, balancing regional security, economic growth and strategic influence in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.
Rahul Mishra is associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and a senior research fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University, Thailand. He can be reached at rahul.seas@gmail.com and followed on X at @rahulmishr_
Harshit Prajapati is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. He can be reached at harshi55_isn@jnu.ac.in and followed on X at @harshitp_47
