Professor S.I. Keethaponcalan on Two Years of the AKD Presidency in Sri Lanka

It is a little over two years since Anura Kumara Dissanayake, or AKD as he is popularly known, was elected Sri Lanka’s ninth executive president. His victory was an unambiguous vote for change. Unlike his predecessors, AKD did not belong to a political dynasty, nor did he hail from an elite background. Seven weeks after he took over the reins as president, AKD’s National People’s Power (NPP), a coalition of leftist parties, won an emphatic victory in general elections, not only securing a two-thirds majority in parliament but also performing well in the Tamil-dominated Northern Province. Understandably, expectations for AKD ran high.

So how has his government performed? In a discussion with Sudha Ramachandran, South Asia editor of The Diplomat, Professor Soosaipillai I. Keethaponcalan, former chair of the Conflict Analysis and Dispute Resolution Department at Salisbury University in Maryland, said that while AKD has done a “commendable job” on the economic front and has sought to prosecute corrupt politicians, he has done “very little, if anything” in finding a political solution to the ethnic conflict. “There have been no significant prosecutions of those responsible for wartime atrocities,” he said.

Besides, the AKD government has taken no steps towards revoking the executive presidency — a key election campaign pledge. “Like many of its predecessors, [the AKD government] may have come to appreciate the extensive powers of the executive presidency and may believe that these powers are necessary for political stability,” Keethaponcalan said.

Although Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the NPP were at the forefront of the criticism of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s debt restructuring strategy, as president he followed the same strategy to satisfy IMF norms. How different has his presidency been from that of his predecessors?

I used to believe that in Sri Lanka, two entities were firmly committed to their ideological positions and goals. One was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the other was the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP). The LTTE perished partly because of its unwavering commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam. However, I have been surprised by how adaptive and flexible the JVP has become in its ideological positions over the last two years. The party, which forms the core of the NPP government, has demonstrated remarkable flexibility in responding to current realities and political compulsions.

The JVP launched two unsuccessful armed rebellions to establish a socialist state in Sri Lanka. Given this history, I was surprised to see how readily the party moved away from its socialist ideology after coming to power. Its dramatic shift in its traditionally anti-Indian position is another example of this ideological flexibility.

Similarly, while in opposition, the JVP strongly resisted Ranil Wickremesinghe’s strategy of securing an IMF bailout and implementing the associated economic restructuring program. However, once in power, the party appears to have recognized the importance of the IMF program and has continued with essentially the same strategy. The current IMF program is scheduled to expire in March 2027, and I would not be surprised if the NPP government sought a new agreement with the IMF. Such a decision would further demonstrate the remarkable transformation of the JVP’s economic policy orientation.

However, I see some differences, particularly the government’s apparent determination to prosecute former political leaders accused of corruption and other malpractices. During his presidency, Wickremesinghe failed to adequately address corruption, one of the major grievances highlighted by the Aragalaya (“struggle” in Sinhala) — the mass protests in 2022 that toppled the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government and created the political circumstances that eventually brought him to power.

Nevertheless, in my view, the incumbent NPP government has largely continued the policies of its predecessors, particularly those pursued by Wickremesinghe. The most striking change, therefore, is not in the direction of government policy but in the JVP’s willingness to abandon or modify positions it had defended for decades.

AKD had promised to abolish the executive presidency. He has the numbers in parliament to push through constitutional change. So why hasn’t he acted?

Sri Lanka has had, and continues to have, a political movement advocating the abolition of the executive presidential system and the restoration of a parliamentary form of government. Traditionally, the JVP, including President Dissanayake as one of its leaders, played a pivotal role in this movement. That is precisely why the party promised to abolish the executive presidency in its 2024 election manifesto.

As you know, the NPP secured a comfortable majority of more than two-thirds in parliament. Yet it has taken no significant steps toward constitutional reform. Instead, in September 2026, it amended the constitution to increase the retirement age of Supreme Court judges — a relatively minor and, in my view, unnecessary change.

Consequently, two years after Dissanayake came to power, the constitution introduced by the JVP’s former arch-enemy, President J. R. Jayewardene, remains largely intact. I doubt that the NPP government will demonstrate much enthusiasm for constitutional reform in the near future.

I see two possible reasons for this reluctance. First, the NPP government, like many of its predecessors, may have come to appreciate the extensive powers of the executive presidency and may believe that these powers are necessary for political stability. Second, initiating a comprehensive constitutional reform process could force the government to confront several politically uncomfortable questions. One such question concerns the future of the provincial council system, which the JVP vehemently opposed in the past. Should the system be retained, reformed, or abolished? Any of these choices could create political difficulties for the government.

What steps has AKD taken with regard to finding a political solution to Tamil grievances?

Very little, if anything. Traditionally, the JVP, like many Sinhala nationalist organizations, did not recognize the existence of an ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka or acknowledge that Tamils faced grievances specific to their community. Instead, the party viewed Sri Lanka’s problem primarily as one of terrorism. Therefore, I am not surprised that the NPP government has shown little interest in pursuing a political solution to Tamil grievances. There has been no meaningful dialogue with Tamil political leaders specifically aimed at finding such a solution.

In his 2024 election manifesto, Dissanayake promised to hold the long-delayed provincial council elections. That promise remains unfulfilled. This is particularly significant because the NPP won parliamentary seats in the Jaffna district in 2024, with Tamil voters electing JVP-affiliated candidates in a remarkable departure from traditional voting patterns.

I do not necessarily believe that the government’s reluctance to hold provincial council elections is motivated by racism or ethnic discrimination. Rather, I suspect that the government is uncomfortable facing voters at this juncture because its political appeal appears to be eroding.

Interestingly, I do not see much public pressure from the Tamil community over the continued postponement of provincial council elections. The major Tamil political parties have also failed to make this issue a significant central political demand. Consequently, the government faces little sustained pressure to address the Tamil question through meaningful political negotiations or constitutional reform.

How would you rate this government’s performance in bringing to justice those who carried out horrific crimes, even atrocities, against the Tamils during the civil war?

Not encouraging. The government has yet to meet many of the demands made through the United Nations Human Rights Council processes in Geneva. Nor has it introduced significant new initiatives to address the grievances of the victims. Families of those who disappeared during the final phase of the war continue their protests and campaigns demanding justice. To my knowledge, there have been no significant prosecutions of those responsible for wartime atrocities.

For example, more human remains have recently been recovered from the Chemmani mass graves in Jaffna, where hundreds of individuals are believed to have been buried. Yet the government has not established a systematic, adequately empowered mechanism to investigate such crimes and ensure accountability.

In Sri Lanka, regardless of who is in power, investigating and prosecuting war-related crimes, particularly those allegedly committed by members of the armed forces, is politically extremely difficult. Such a move could amount to political suicide for any government. Therefore, I have little hope that the families of those who disappeared or were killed during the civil war will receive the justice they have been demanding for so long.

An infant’s feeding bottle is among the items found at the Chemmani mass grave site in Sri Lanka’s Jaffna peninsula.
X/Tamil Genocide Education Project

How is the Sri Lankan economy doing under President Dissanayake?

I think the NPP government has done a commendable job on this front. However, the credit for pulling Sri Lanka out of the 2022 economic crisis and restoring some economic stability should go primarily to Wickremesinghe. The NPP government made a sensible decision to accept and continue most of the economic policies and programs Wickremesinghe introduced. That strategy has worked, and Sri Lanka’s economy remains relatively stable.

The NPP government has also made its own progress. For example, Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves increased from approximately US$4.5 billion in 2023 to around US$7 billion in August 2026. This is a significant achievement.

Nevertheless, I believe a more meaningful assessment of the government’s economic performance can be made after the current IMF bailout program expires in March 2027. How the government manages the economy beyond the current IMF arrangement will be a crucial test of its economic policies.

There are plans to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 1979 with new anti-terrorism legislation. Does Sri Lanka have a terrorism problem today?

After the civil war ended in 2009, human rights organizations, both domestic and international, began demanding the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, arguing that the defeat of the LTTE had removed its principal justification. The Rajapaksa government rejected these demands, while the Yahapalana government led by Maithripala Sirisena and Wickremesinghe failed to deliver the promised reforms.

Against this backdrop, the Easter Sunday bombings took place in 2019. This was a major terrorist attack carried out by Islamist extremists with links to ISIS. Therefore, we cannot argue that Sri Lanka faces no terrorist or security threats. The government needs effective mechanisms to address such threats. However, these mechanisms must not violate citizens’ fundamental rights or undermine democracy.

During the 2024 elections, the NPP appealed to liberal-minded voters, among others, and promised to repeal the PTA. Yet, nearly two years after assuming power, the government has failed to fulfill that promise. Instead, it has continued to use the PTA, including in connection with domestic issues such as drug-related offenses. There have also been allegations that the law has been used to restrict freedom of expression.

Now, the government proposes to replace the PTA with the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA). However, the proposed legislation has already attracted serious criticism from human rights organizations, particularly over its broad definition of terrorism and the extensive powers it would confer on the executive and security forces. Therefore, from a human rights and democratic freedoms perspective, the proposed legislation does not look particularly promising.

Dissanayake has support in parliament and also among the public. Are Sri Lankans satisfied with his presidency?

In the 2024 presidential election, Dissanayake secured about 42 percent of the first-preference vote. His party, the NPP, then received a major boost, winning about 61 percent of the national vote and securing 159 seats in parliament in the November 2024 parliamentary election. However, the party could not sustain this momentum, as its share of the national vote declined to approximately 43 percent in the May 2025 local government elections. Some recent opinion polls also suggest that the government’s popularity has been declining.

I suspect that this declining popularity is one of the main reasons the government is reluctant to hold further elections, particularly the long-delayed provincial council elections. The high cost of living, heavy taxation, and the failure to adequately address pressing social problems, such as organized crime and drug-related activities, appear to have contributed to growing public dissatisfaction.

The emerging controversy involving Gnanasara Thera, a Buddhist monk who is the general secretary of the militant Bodhu Bala Sena, could also create political difficulties for the government. The decision to have police escort the monk to court in prison attire instead of his Buddhist monk’s robes, which carries considerable religious and cultural significance, could anger sections of the Sinhala Buddhist community, particularly nationalist voters. This controversy could further undermine the government’s popularity among these groups.

Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between declining popularity and a complete loss of public support. The NPP still enjoys a substantial electoral base. In my view, the more important question is not simply whether the government retains public support, but how much of its original electoral momentum it has lost.