The Evolution of the Baloch Liberation Army
The recent spate of high-profile attacks, including the Jaffer Express’ hijacking in March, by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), points to its evolution from a group of guerrillas operating in the mountains to an urban guerrilla movement.
One of the deadliest Baloch insurgent groups, the BLA has not only improved its operational and organizational strength, but it has also enhanced its propaganda capabilities.
Starting as an armed insurrection in the early 2000s that sought political autonomy and a greater share of Balochistan’s mineral riches, the BLA gradually evolved into a separatist group based on Baloch identity and resource nationalism. While previous generations of Baloch insurgents were grounded in the Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the BLA identifies Baloch nationalism as its main ideology.
The BLA is the second South Asian insurgent group to hijack a train. In 2009, about 200 cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist briefly hijacked a passenger train with 350 passengers onboard during the national elections. As the insurgencies in Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have been quelled, while those in India’s Northeast have been largely weakened, it is safe to assume that the BLA is South Asia’s most potent and organized insurgent group.
The BLA ticks all the boxes that are critical for a group to wage a successful insurgency. It has pockets of support in society, external sanctuaries, guerrilla warfare capabilities, a terrain suitable for hit-and-run operations, and a discredited government struggling to govern and maintain its writ. The BLA’s grievance-based victimhood narrative, even if it is exaggerated, resonates with the Baloch masses, and sections of Baloch society sympathize with the group despite disagreeing with its violent approach.
Besides, the group has sanctuaries in Iran and Afghanistan, enabling it to sustain its attacks inside Balochistan. Additionally, the group has honed its guerrilla warfare capabilities in recent years by adopting suicide terrorism and acquiring more lethal and advanced weapons left behind by the United States in Afghanistan. Equally, Balochistan’s sparsely populated mountainous terrain is tailor-made for insurgent warfare. Finally, the current handpicked government in Balochistan has no roots in the people, and is struggling to maintain its writ amid a deteriorating security situation in the restive province.
As a separatist insurgency, the BLA has evolved from a traditional mountain-based guerrilla group hitting power pylons, mobile towers, gas pipelines and railway tracks to an urban guerrilla movement targeting security check posts and military camps as well as Chinese projects and nationals with suicide bombers. Alarmingly, the BLA has also started blocking Balochistan’s main highways and has briefly taken over far-flung towns as its numerical and operational strength has improved. Both tactics are aimed at creating an impression that the state’s writ is weakening while the insurgents’ influence is increasing.
Insurgencies evolve from mountain to urban-based movements due to several factors, such as growing urbanization, new emerging technologies, and shifting tactics of insurgent groups. Balochistan has witnessed rapid urbanization in the past decade due to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), rural-to-urban migration, and a higher urban population growth rate than rural areas of the province.
Similarly, the deeper penetration of internet and social media has enabled groups like the BLA to articulate their victimhood narrative forcefully and increase their appeal among angry and vulnerable segments of Baloch society. Social media has bridged the gaps between different sections of Baloch society and provided them with a platform to engender a new and more radical form of Baloch nationalism, which has served as a force multiplier for the BLA.
The BLA’s tactics have also evolved, as discussed above, from hit-and-run operations against tactical targets to more high-profile and well-coordinated attacks against strategic targets involving suicide terrorism, roadblocks, and brief takeovers of far-flung towns. The Baloch insurgents have also shifted their strategy from defensive to offensive insurgent warfare.
The new insurgent leadership has been equally critical in changing the character of the BLA as an insurgent group. The split between London-based BLA leader Hyrbyair Marri and Balochistan-based commanders such as Aslam Baloch and Bashir Zeb pushed the BLA from a tribal to a middle-class insurgency. Aslam and Zeb emerged from the Baloch Student Organization-Azad’s cadres and joined the BLA later on. Their followers carry no tribal baggage, and they have democratized the Baloch insurgent movement, which paved the way for educated Baloch youth alienated by the Pakistani state’s high-handedness to join the BLA. The shift from tribal to middle-class struggle even encouraged women such as Shari Baloch, Sumaiya Qalandrani, and Mahal Baloch to enlist as suicide bombers for the BLA’s Majeed Brigade.
The Pakistani state’s decision to adopt a security-centric response to the recent upsurge of attacks in Balochistan will add more fuel to the fire. Though an operation is imperative to resurrect the state’s control and scale down the level of insurgent violence, addressing the genuine grievances of the Baloch people is the only way to find a long-term solution in Balochistan. The BLA’s evolution from a mountain to an urban guerrilla movement is a verdict against the state’s counterproductive policy of solving a political problem through an over-securitized and overmilitarized approach.
