The Indian Ocean Has Too Many Forums and Too Few Deliverables
The 9th Indian Ocean Conference was held in Mauritius from April 10 to 12, under the theme “Collective Stewardship for Indian Ocean Governance.” It was an ideal topic at a time when the Indian Ocean is no longer a peaceful maritime space through which oil, containers, fish, data, and naval vessels pass. It has become a space where major powers are asserting themselves, some more violently than others.
The vulnerability of the Indian Ocean to conflicts thousands of miles away was underscored recently when the U.S. Navy sank the Iranian frigate, IRIS Dena, on March 4, and seized Iranian cargo ships close to India and Sri Lanka in late April. These developments, especially the sinking of IRIS Dena have prompted questions about the capacity and willingness of regional institutions to respond to these vulnerabilities.
The Indian Ocean Region does not lack institutions. Countries in South Asia, for example, came together in the 1980s to form the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). But it never got off the ground because of the rivalry between India and Pakistan.
In the past decade, several institutions related to the Indian Ocean were established, with India’s blessings, which sought to build regional institutions that excluded Pakistan.
The Indian Ocean Conference emerged as a major Track 1.5 platform. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) was established as an intergovernmental forum. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) links South and Southeast Asia around the Bay of Bengal. The Colombo Security Conclave focuses on maritime security. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, the Quad’s maritime initiatives, information fusion centers, and various bilateral and minilateral arrangements add further layers to the architecture.
These have been established to face the diverse threats to the region, including piracy, illegal fishing, narcotics trafficking, marine pollution, maritime disasters, debt distress, climate change, undersea cable vulnerability, and disruptions at chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Red Sea.
But the multiplication of institutions has not translated into stronger protection; if anything, smaller states like Sri Lanka are more vulnerable than ever to all the above-mentioned threats, as well as to extra-regional actors.
For decades, Sri Lanka has turned to regional institutions as a way of preserving autonomy, balancing India, expanding economic options, and avoiding overdependence on any single power. SAARC once promised a rules-based South Asian order that could give smaller states a collective voice. BIMSTEC later offered a way to bypass the India-Pakistan deadlock and connect Sri Lanka to Southeast Asia. The IORA appeared even more relevant because it placed maritime security, the blue economy, fisheries, disaster risk management, and climate adaptation at the center of regional cooperation. Yet, none of these has lived up to their promise.
For smaller South Asian states, SAARC’s original attraction lay in the possibility of creating a strong regional institution that allowed the region to negotiate and forward its interests on the international stage. But its development was stymied from the beginning due to the India-Pakistan rivalry. SAARC has not held a heads-of-state summit since 2014. Intra-regional trade in South Asia remains low as both the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) have not been fully implemented.
BIMSTEC evoked much hope in South Asia as it brings together South and Southeast Asian states. Its agenda, i.e., trade, technology, energy, transport, tourism, and fisheries, aligns closely with Sri Lanka’s ambitions to become a logistics and maritime hub. Sri Lanka’s growing links with Thailand, including its recent free trade agreement, show the potential of Bay of Bengal connectivity. But BIMSTEC has also struggled to mature. It lacked a permanent secretariat until 2014 and took 25 years to adopt a charter. Negotiations on the BIMSTEC Free Trade Area have dragged on, held up by disagreements over rules of origin, early harvest arrangements, and trade in services. Political instability in member states and tensions between Myanmar and Bangladesh have further slowed progress. BIMSTEC may be more politically convenient for India than SAARC, but convenience is not the same as institutional effectiveness.
The IORA’s agenda fits Sri Lanka’s needs almost perfectly, i.e., maritime safety, fisheries, blue economy development, disaster risk management, science and technology, tourism, and women’s economic empowerment. Sri Lanka’s economy is tied to Indian Ocean connectivity, and recent maritime disasters such as the fire on the X-Press Pearl underscored the urgent need for regional mechanisms to deal with oil spills, chemical pollution, and compensation.
Still, the IORA has not given most members tangible benefits. Its consensus-based decision-making makes it difficult to move from discussion to action. There are no strong binding mechanisms, no dedicated funding pool, and no regional spill-response protocol with the operational capacity that vulnerable coastal states require.
The 9th Indian Ocean Conference tried to address this by emphasizing “collective stewardship.” However, stewardship must mean more than speeches. If the Indian Ocean’s institutions are to matter, they need to start showing concrete results.
First, the IORA should prioritize a funded regional maritime disaster response mechanism. The Indian Ocean has already seen the consequences of oil spills, ship fires, climate change and hazardous cargo incidents. A regional mechanism should include pre-positioned equipment, trained rapid-response teams, liability coordination, and technical support for smaller states.
Second, institutions such as the IORA and BIMSTEC should become project-specific coalitions. Smaller groups of willing states should be able to advance cooperation on fisheries monitoring, port digitalization, undersea cable protection, or customs harmonization without waiting for every member to agree.
Third, Sri Lanka should push for measurable benchmarks. Regional forums often celebrate participation, but participation alone is not a policy outcome. Colombo should ask, how many joint patrols were conducted? How much funding was mobilized? How many officers were trained? How much response time was reduced in maritime emergencies? How much was the cost of trade lowered?
Fourth, Sri Lanka should connect its own port-centered development strategy to regional public goods. Colombo and Hambantota should not be viewed only as assets in the India-China competition. They can support regional logistics, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, rest and recreation services, and supply-chain resilience. If framed properly, Sri Lanka’s geography can contribute to regional stability rather than be merely a prize in strategic rivalry.
The Indian Ocean Conference has value. It creates space for dialogue, brings ministers and experts together, and keeps maritime governance on the diplomatic agenda. But the region’s future will not be secured by more conferences. The test is whether the Indian Ocean’s expanding institutional architecture can produce practical benefits for the states most exposed to maritime risk.
